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Separate Judicial Speech 
 
COSETTE D. CREAMER* & NEHA JAIN* 
 
Domestic and international judges speak separately from their courts’ institutional 
voice in myriad ways. Instances of separate judicial speech range from written and oral 
dissents, to posing questions from the bench, to an array of extrajudicial activities, such as 
media appearances and penning memoirs. In the United States, despite long-standing con-
cerns that individual speech by judges will undermine the corporate vision of a court and 
erode “the cult of the robe,” many now view separate judicial speech as serving a valuable 
function by contributing to the judiciary’s authority and legitimacy. Yet, while legal schol-
ars have devoted considerable attention to the practice of separate opinion writing, they 
often ignore differences in types of concurrences or dissents and largely gloss over the other 
ways in which judges speak separately on and off the bench. International legal scholars 
similarly focus on separate written opinions to the exclusion of the broader array of indi-
vidual judicial speech, behavior, and practices. This Article interrogates the formal and 
informal ways in which judges make their voices heard and offers an interdisciplinary 
typology of separate judicial speech, suggesting that it falls along five dimensions of variance 
that transcend the domestic/international law divide. It argues that different forms of 
separate speech reveal markedly different understandings of the role judges do and should 
play within society. It concludes by considering the normative stakes involved in judges 
speaking separately and the implications for courts in an era of backlash against interna-
tional institutions and growing challenges to the rule of law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 It was a frosty spring morning in the Hague on April 26, 2012, where a 
packed courtroom awaited the historic verdict of the Special Tribunal for 
Sierra Leone in the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.1 Taylor 
appeared unmoved as Presiding Judge Richard Lussick read out the forty-
four page “summary” of the judgment unanimously finding him guilty of 
various crimes against humanity and war crimes.2 As the three-member 
panel rose to leave the courtroom, things took a dramatic turn. Judge Ed 
Hadji Malik Sow, a Senegalese jurist appointed to serve as an “alternate 
judge,” began speaking to voice his disagreement.3 Undeterred, the judges 
continued to file out of the courtroom as Judge Sow, whose microphone 
had been cut off, persisted in speaking from behind the glass barrier until a 
metal grate was drawn across the public gallery.4 Later that day, a copy of 
his statement, recorded by the court stenographer as a routine matter, began 
to circulate amongst trial observers.5 In his “dissent” Judge Sow lamented 
that the absence of any deliberative process amongst the judges forced him 
to voice his disagreement within the courtroom. This process—as well as 
the verdict itself—made him fear for the legitimacy of the system of inter-
national criminal justice.6 
 Judge Sow’s public statement and the unexpected manner of its delivery 
provoked consternation amongst observers for exposing the strained rela-
tionships between the judges and for casting doubt on the strength of the 
prosecution’s case in one of most high-profile international criminal trials in 
history.7 While commentators uniformly acknowledged that Judge Sow’s 
opinion was of little consequence as a formal matter of law, there was con-
cern that his public repudiation of the legal process would give credence to 
Taylor-apologists and undermine prospects for accountability and reconcil-
iation in Liberia and Sierra Leone.8 
                                               
1. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment (May 18, 2012).  
2. Jennifer Easterday & Sara Kendall, Judge Sow’s Struck Statement & Reflections on the Taylor Judgment 
& the SCSL’s Legacies, INTLAWGRRLS (Apr. 28, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://tinyurl.com/y6jrk74t. 
3. Id.; see Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 12, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 (establishing 
the role of the “alternate judge”). 
4. Easterday & Kendall, supra note 2. 
5. Id. 
6. William A. Schabas, Charles Taylor Judgment Suggests a More Modest Level of Participation in the Sierra 
Leone Conflict, PHD STUD. IN HUM. RTS. (Apr. 28, 2012, 7:31 AM), https://tinyurl.com/y6qoznzt 
(citing a public statement made by Judge Sow). 
7. Charles Jalloh, The Verdict in the Charles Taylor Case and the Alternate Judge’s “Dissenting Opinion,” 
EUR. J. INT’L L. BLOG: EJIL: TALK! (May 11, 2012), https://tinyurl.com/y4nh8ts3. 
8. See Kevin Jon Heller, One “Dissent” in the Taylor Case, OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 26, 2012), 
https://tinyurl.com/y34jr8b8 (declaring the opinion as “legally irrelevant” but supporting the thesis as 
to the weakness of the prosecution’s case); Jalloh, supra note 7, at 4 (characterizing Judge Sow’s opinion 
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 What motivates an adjudicator like Judge Sow to speak beyond and sep-
arately from a unanimous or majority verdict, especially when this speech 
will have no formal legal effect? Does the form (oral) and style (confronta-
tional) of speech matter? Was Judge Sow justified in speaking out within the 
formal space of the courtroom immediately after the delivery of the “unan-
imous” judgment? Or would it have been more appropriate for him to air 
his views in an unofficial forum, as he in fact did a few months later?9 Was 
it correct to sanction him for his courtroom statement and/or was it suffi-
cient to have his statement expunged from the official court records?10 
 These and related questions animate this Article on separate judicial 
speech, that is, any instance of a judge speaking individually and not for the 
court on which she sits. The Article demonstrates that not all such instances 
are alike, and that differences in form reveal markedly different judicial self-
understandings and external perceptions of the role judges do and should 
play within society. They also have consequences for law-making and insti-
tutional politics. Despite this, scholarship in both domestic and international 
law tends to focus solely on written separate opinions, with some attention 
to oral dissents in the context of the Supreme Court of the United States.11 
While a distinction between dissents and concurrences is sometimes made 
in the American legal context and less frequently at the regional and inter-
national level, those studying judicial behavior tend to gloss over differences 
in types of concurrences and/or dissents,12 and almost never focus on the 
other ways in which a judge can “speak” separately.  
 This Article asks what the structure, function, and role perception of 
courts would look like if one took the phenomenon of judicial speech seri-
ously. One contribution of this Article is to identify and interrogate the for-
mal and informal ways in which judges—both domestic and international—
make their voices heard. When judges write or speak separately—as they 
often do when they dissent, concur, ask questions from the bench, publish 
academic articles, write memoirs, and sanction biographies and biopics—
what function(s) do they perform? Do different forms of speaking sepa-
rately carry the same connotation: does an academic article by a judge 
                                               
as a “public statement” rather than a dissent, which would nonetheless undermine the verdict in the 
trial). 
9. Justice Sow: “Charles Taylor Should Have Walked Free,” NEW AFR. MAG. (Dec. 14, 2012), 
https://newafricanmagazine.com/3453/ (quoting an interview with Judge Sow). 
10. Charles C. Jalloh, Why the Special Court for Sierra Leone Should Establish an Independent Commission 
to Address Alternate Judge Sow’s Allegation in the Charles Taylor Case, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Oct. 1, 2012), 
https://tinyurl.com/y6tfl7v3 (discussing disciplinary proceedings instituted against Judge Sow that 
concluded he was unfit to sit as a judge at the SCSL).  
11. On the important differences between written versus oral communication in the judicial 
context, see, e.g., Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (2008).  
12. But see Thomas B. Bennett et al., Divide & Concur: Separate Opinions & Legal Change, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 817 (2018). 
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discussing her judicial reasoning have the same resonance as a separate opin-
ion? Is speaking separately an inherently public act or would a “graveyard 
dissent,”13 where the judge buries her dissent despite serious internal disa-
greement with the majority, count as a speech act? 
 Drawing from comparative, domestic, and international scholarship in 
the areas of law and political science, this Article offers a typology of sepa-
rate judicial speech, claiming that it falls along at least five dimensions of 
variance. Some instances of speaking separately are more visible and insti-
tutionalized than others; others are hidden and informal. Some are expressly 
and dialogically directed at an immediate audience; others do not attempt to 
engage in a dialogue or are directed to some future audience. Some are 
purely individual acts, while others are collective speech acts that still remain 
separate from the court. These dimensions are neither exhaustive nor reflec-
tive of binary categories; rather, they represent layered continuums upon 
which we might place a judge’s separate speech act.  
 A second contribution of this Article is to suggest a different vantage 
point for addressing both long-standing and new controversies in interna-
tional law with real-world consequences. International judicial bodies have 
been treated as monolithic entities for much of their history, rather than 
aggregates of distinct individuals with diverse experiences, interests, moti-
vations, cultural backgrounds, and political preferences and constraints. In 
focusing on the various ways in which judges signal their individuality 
through separate speech, we seek to reorient this conversation to produce 
an account of international judicial behavior, practices, and consequences. 
Understanding separate judicial speech is not simply an academic exercise: 
judges wield considerable power and influence that should be exercised as 
appropriately as possible. This Article thus has both normative and practical 
implications for the design of international judicial institutions and for stake-
holder buy-in for international courts at a time when their future looks far 
from secure. 
 Finally, this Article adds to the burgeoning literature challenging the tra-
ditional separation between international and domestic law-making and legal 
institutions.14 Empirical analysis of international judicial behavior has been 
sparse, hermetically sealed from domestic debates, and mostly oriented 
                                               
13. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. (June 10, 
1982) (on file with the Supreme Court Case Files Collection, Powell Papers, Lewis F. Powell Jr. 
Archives at Washington & Lee University School of Law), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/ 
casefiles/409/ (“I do not feel strongly enough . . . to write separately and thus shall give you one of 
Charlie Whittaker’s ‘graveyard dissents.’”). 
14. COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018); Anthea Roberts et 
al., Comparative International Law: Framing the Field, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467 (2015); Anthea Roberts, Com-
parative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & 
COMPAR. L.Q. 57, 61-64 (2011). 
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towards technical, doctrinal questions that ignore the sociology of interna-
tional judicial behavior. Likewise, even though there is a rich body of legal 
and non-legal scholarship that dissects and evaluates judicial behavior in the 
domestic context, it makes virtually no reference to courts outside the 
United States.15 Moreover, even this sophisticated domestic literature often 
fails to recognize and account for the different ways in which judges com-
municate amongst themselves, with other organs of the state, and with the 
public. This Article offers a typology of judicial speech that transcends the 
domestic/international divide. Thus, though it illustrates the consequences 
of different forms of individual judicial speech for international legal and 
political institutions, it simultaneously provides lessons for domestic judicial 
institutions and law-making. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the history of sepa-
rate judicial speech in the American context and normative and ethical de-
bates surrounding judges speaking apart from the corporate entity of a 
court. Part II analyzes the phenomenon of individual judicial speech at the 
international level both on and off the bench, describing the rules and prac-
tices that encourage or proscribe separate speech and unpacking the norma-
tive, policy, and pragmatic concerns that arise from judges speaking sepa-
rately. Part III draws on the accounts of separate judicial speech in domestic 
and international law and adopts an interdisciplinary lens to argue that not 
all forms of speaking separately are alike; rather, judicial speech falls along 
five dimensions of variance, reflecting different approaches to the judicial 
role and function. Part IV draws from this typology to consider the conse-
quences of and stakes involved in different forms of judicial separate speech 
and outlines an agenda for future research.  
 
II. SPEAKING SEPARATELY IN U.S. COURTS 
The practice of voicing separate opinions has a long—albeit conten-
tious—pedigree in U.S. courts. Judges habitually make their views heard, 
both on and off the bench, exemplifying the Nation’s commitment to free-
dom of speech. This Part traces (1) the historical development of speaking 
separately on the American bench, (2) the various ways in which American 
judges “speak” off the bench and ethical rules governing these activities, and 
(3) the roles and values ascribed to the phenomenon of judges speaking sep-
arately. Since the Nation’s founding, lawyers, judges, and commentators 
have debated the virtues, harms, propriety, and constitutionality of speaking 
separately. This Part will further describe these normative debates and their 
implications for the practice of separate judicial speech. 
                                               
15. But see John Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
221 (2000). 
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A. Speaking Separately from the Bench 
For the first dozen years after the founding of the new republic, Justices 
on the U.S. Supreme Court heard relatively few cases and spent most of 
their time “riding circuit” on one of three circuit court panels.16 When the 
Court did publish opinions, it followed the practice of the English Common 
Law Courts and issued opinions seriatim, with each published by reverse 
seniority.17 Occasionally—largely for uncomplicated unanimous cases that 
did not require extensive legal justification—opinions would be filed under 
the heading “By the Court.”18 This tradition changed in 1801 with the ap-
pointment of John Marshall as Chief Justice.  
Marshall began issuing decisions through a single opinion, which he of-
ten authored. Marshall attempted to present the appearance of a unanimous 
Court, notwithstanding disagreement among Justices, in order to strengthen 
its authority vis-à-vis the other branches of government.19 The proclivity to 
author separate opinions increased slightly a few years later, with the ap-
pointment of William Johnson, the first Jeffersonian Republican on the 
Court.20 Indeed, President Thomas Jefferson encouraged Johnson to write 
separately, and Johnson endeavored to do so “on all subjects of general in-
terest; particularly constitutional questions.”21 Still, “go-along voting”22 or 
silent acquiescence remained common until the early twentieth century.23  
                                               
16. Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2069, 2071 (1995).  
17. Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 
CORNELL L.Q. 186, 192 (1958-1959). Notably, individual opinions were not published by either the 
Privy Council in England, which acted as the ultimate appellate body for the American colonial courts, 
or the House of Lords, the ultimate appellate body for cases arising in English courts of common law 
and equity. Instead of following the practice of either of these appellate bodies, “it is more probable 
that those who laid the foundations for Supreme Court practice drew primarily upon the customs and 
rules of the English Courts” with which the Justices were most familiar, namely the Common Law 
Courts such as The King’s Bench. Id. at 188, 190-92.  
18. Id. at 192. 
19. See Kolsky, supra note 16, at 2074 (noting that, of 1,244 total judgments, the Marshall Court 
issued only seventy dissents). 
20. James Markham, Against Individually Signed Judicial Opinions, 56 DUKE L.J. 923, 928 (2006) 
(“[I]nitial forays into the practice of the Justices writing separately from the majority opinion of the 
Court, though the first true dissent was not issued until 1806 by Justice Paterson in Simms & Wise v. 
Slacum.”); MELVIN UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT’S HIS-
TORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 47 (2015). 
21. Kolsky, supra note 16, at 2079 (quoting Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson 
(Apr. 11, 1823), microformed on The Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Microfilm Series 1, 
Reel 53). 
22. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 
3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993). 
23. Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 90 (1827) (Chief Justice Marshall noting that it was his 
“custom, when I have the misfortune to differ from this Court, [to] acquiesce silently in its opinion.”); 
see also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 455 (1815) (Justice Story noting in a rare dissent that 
“[h]ad this been an ordinary case I should have contented myself with silence.”). 
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Marshall’s norm of consensus guided subsequent Chief Justices; be-
tween 1801 and 1940 the Court “was overwhelmingly likely to decide cases 
without either dissents or separate concurrences.”24 The American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) reflected this “spirit of the times”25 in its 1924 Canons of 
Judicial Ethics, which discouraged dissenting opinions in most instances.26 
This norm slowly began to change after Congress granted the Court its cer-
tiorari authority in 1925.27 
An even more robust tradition of writing separately began to develop 
during the early 1940s and New Deal era. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
valorized the ability to dissent in the search for sound legal principles and 
disapproved of efforts to discourage separate opinions, leading to separate 
opinions steadily becoming customary practice.28 The modern Court has 
continued this tradition, despite current Chief Justice John Roberts’ an-
nouncement that he would be “seeking greater consensus.”29 Federal circuit 
and state court appellate judges have similarly found value in issuing separate 
                                               
24. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 
771 (2015). During the 1920s, for instance, the Court under Chief Justice William Howard Taft decided 
more than eighty percent of its cases unanimously. See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as 
Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 
1267, 1331, 1332 (2001). 
25. Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Divided They Stand; The High Court and the Triumph of Discord, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001 (§ 4), at 1. 
26. Alex Simpson, Jr., Dissenting Opinions, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 217 n.26 (1923) (quoting ABA 
Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics No. 19, which provided that “except in case of conscientious 
difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissents should be discouraged.”). The ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted in 1972, removed this provision. See Kermit V. Lipez, Some Reflections 
on Dissenting, 57 ME. L. REV. 313, 315 (2005). 
27. Greenhouse, supra note 25, at 1 (characterizing this discretionary authority as “bolster[ing] the 
concept of law as an evolutionary process rather than a static set of rules to be applied to particular 
facts and . . . made it less likely for justices to acquiesce in decisions with which they did not agree.”). 
There is little consensus about what precisely led to the displacement of the consensus norm. Scholars 
often point to, inter alia, changes in chief justice leadership styles, increased ideological division among 
the justices, new legal issue areas, internal procedural and institutional changes, and discretionary con-
trol of the docket. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 24; Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein & William J. Dixon, 
On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988). 
28. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 771, 790-91 (“5-4 divisions became unremarkable.”). 
29. Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2006), 
https://tinyurl.com/y4ubezle; M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory 
of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283; Sunstein, supra note 24, at 783-84 (noting a slight decrease in separate 
opinions during the 2013 term). 
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opinions,30 although they tend to issue fewer of them than Supreme Court 
Justices.31 
Written separate opinions are now commonplace across the judiciary.32 
At the level of the Supreme Court, there is also a long history of reading 
individual opinions aloud. Since its first decision in 1792, the Court almost 
always announced an opinion orally prior to its transcription. When it began 
to submit written opinions to the Court Reporter in 1834, Justices continued 
to announce their opinions, through either a verbatim reading or a summary 
description.33 In an extreme instance of this practice, each Justice wrote and 
read his own opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,34 with the ruling’s announce-
ment taking two full days to complete.35  
Oral separate opinions remained fairly common through the 1960s, a 
practice that changed in 1969 with Warren Burger’s appointment as Chief 
Justice. Burger sought to reduce the visibility of decision announcements, 
and thus attempted to abandon the Court’s unique practice of reading opin-
ions from the bench; the Associate Justices resisted this proposal but ulti-
mately agreed to limit announcements to summaries of opinions.36 The 
practice of reading separate opinions from the bench in turn became 
                                               
30. Kolsky, supra note 16, at 2073 (quoting an early decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
in which Justice Rush wrote “[h]owever disposed to concur with my brethren in this cause, I have not 
been able to do it. Unanimity in courts of justice, though a very desirable object, ought never to be 
attained at the expense of sacrificing the judgment.”); see also Frank X. Altimari, The Practice of Dissenting 
in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 275 (1993); Jesse W. Carter, Dissenting Opinions, 4 HASTINGS 
L.J. 118 (1953); Robert G. Flanders, Jr., The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts of Last 
Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 401 (1999); Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices 
of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1962); Lipez, supra note 26; Randall T. Shepard, Perspectives: Notable 
Dissents in State Constitutional Cases - What Can Dissents Teach Us, 68 ALB. L. REV. 337 (2005); Edward C. 
Voss, Dissent: Sign of a Healthy Court, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643 (1992); Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When 
to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1445 
(2012). 
31. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106-07 (2011) (finding that between 1990 
to 2007, 62% of Supreme Court opinions contained a dissent compared to 2.6% percent for the federal 
courts of appeals); see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Dissenting Opinions: In the Georgia Supreme Court, 36 GA. L. 
REV. 539 (2002); Voss, supra note 30; Wood, supra note 30. Similar to the Supreme Court, state court 
appellate judges wrote fewer dissents in the nineteenth as compared to the twentieth century. See, e.g., 
Flanders, supra note 30, at 417-20. 
32. Scholars often contrast the prevalence of separate opinions in the common law tradition with 
the relative secrecy of deliberations and absence of separate opinions in civil law or European 
continental systems. However, the publication of separate opinions is now permitted by the majority 
of European constitutional courts (except for Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg) and 
has a long history in a number of continental judiciaries. See Katalin Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in 
Constitutional Courts, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1345 (2013). 
33. Christopher W. Schmidt & Carolyn Shapiro, Oral Dissenting on the Supreme Court, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 89 (2010).  
34. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
35. Schmidt & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 92-93. 
36. Id. at 108. 
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relatively less common.37 Since the beginning of the Roberts Court in 2005, 
the Court has begun to harken back to past practice of more frequent oral 
dissents.38 Journalists often characterize this act of speaking separately as a 
dramatic and profound expression of disagreement.39 Notably, however, not 
all oral dissents are reported in the media,40 even though Justice John Paul 
Stevens has described oral dissenting as a way to ensure that the media does 
not overlook the separate opinion.41 
A number of empirical studies seek to explain when and why judges pen 
separate opinions.42 Judges tend to issue separate opinions more frequently 
when there is greater ideological diversity on the bench,43 a norm favoring 
separate opinions authorship,44 and for highly salient or legally complex 
cases.45 Conversely, judges issue fewer separate opinions when a court’s 
caseload is heavier.46 A few studies similarly seek to understand why justices 
choose to orally dissent, pointing to many of the same motivations: ideolog-
ical distance; political and legal salience, including whether a case involves 
judicial review of legislation or overturning of precedent; norms of cooper-
ation and reciprocity; and annual caseload.47 
                                               
37. William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, “The Brooding Spirit of the Law”: Supreme Court Justices Reading 
Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 2 (2010) (finding that between 1969 and 2007, Justices read 
only 3.2% of the dissents they penned). 
38. Schmidt & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 111-12. 
39. Joan Biskupic, Voicing Supreme Dissent: Rare, Loud and Clear, WASH. POST, July 5, 1999, at A19 
(characterizing an oral dissent as “a demand for special attention” that is “not a path for the timid.”); 
Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2007), 
https://tinyurl.com/y63wrlf8 (characterizing an oral dissent as “an act of theater that justices use to 
convey their view that the majority is not only mistaken, but profoundly wrong.”).  
40. Schmidt & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 79, 95 (arguing that “extrajudicial actors largely control, 
even create, [their] significance” with coverage having “as much to do with the emotional delivery or 
quirky personality on display as with the legal importance of the dissent itself.”). 
41. RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE MEDIA 
144 (2011). 
42. For one of the earliest such studies, see C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890 (1941). For similar studies on foreign 
courts, see, e.g., Lydia B. Tiede, The Political Determinants of Judicial Dissent: Evidence from the Chilean 
Constitutional Tribunal, 8 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 377 (2016). 
43. Epstein et al., supra note 31; Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, 
Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 123, 134 (2004). But cf. Deborah Beim & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Interplay of Ideological Diversity, 
Dissents, and Discretionary Review in the Judicial Hierarchy: Evidence from Death Penalty Cases, 76 J. POL. 1074 
(2014) (finding that dissents rarely occur for ideologically-mixed panel death penalty cases that produce 
majority-inconsistent decisions, or decisions not in line with the preferences of the ideological majority 
on a panel).  
44. Hettinger et al., supra note 43. 
45. Epstein et al., supra note 31; Hettinger et al., supra note 43. 
46. Epstein et al., supra note 31. But cf. Hettinger et al., supra note 43, at 134 (finding no evidence 
that caseload impacts the likelihood of circuit court judges writing separate opinions). 
47. See, e.g., Blake & Hacker, supra note 37; Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan C. Black & Eve M. 
Ringsmuth, Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1560 (2009). 
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While most commentary focuses on substantive separate opinions, 
judges routinely dissent from a broad range of decisions. These include pro-
cedural or jurisdictional orders, dismissals for mootness, referrals to a state 
court, per curiam opinions, and circuit or state appellate court denials of 
rehearing cases en banc (often called dissentals or concurrals).48 
To be sure, appellate judges do not always see the value in penning sep-
arate opinions. “Dissent aversion” sometimes leads judges to join majority 
opinions even when they disagree with the outcome or legal reasoning.49 
Judges often engage in silent acquiescence with majority opinions, whether 
to avoid the burdens and risks associated with speaking separately50 because 
they do not view a case as sufficiently important, or because the issue is so 
salient that they view unanimity as imperative.51 Supreme Court Justices 
have resorted to sending memos to their colleagues noting their “graveyard 
dissent” while still joining the majority opinion.52  
Rather than silently acquiesce, an appellate judge may also issue a dubi-
tante opinion, indicating doubt about some aspect of a decision but an un-
willingness to place a public dissent on the record.53 Indeed, noting concur-
rences or dissents without providing a reasoned opinion has been common 
practice throughout the Supreme Court’s history,54 though comparatively 
rare for the modern Court.55 One final way in which judges speak separately 
                                               
48. See Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1491 
(2012) (viewing dissentals as “thinly (or not so thinly) veiled entreaties to the Supreme Court.”); Alex 
Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121 YALE L.J. F. 601 (2012); Markham, 
supra note 20. 
49. Epstein et al., supra note 31. 
50. Flanders, supra note 30, at 401. 
51. Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Acquiescence on the Supreme Court, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 3 (2015) (finding that 
silent acquiescence is less likely to occur in cases that raise constitutional issues or are either publicly 
or personally salient). 
52. See, e.g., Greg Goelzhauser, Graveyard Dissents on the Burger Court, 40 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 188 (2015). 
53. Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2006); Roscoe Pound, Caco-
ethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794, 795 (1953) (“[T]he dissenting judge can 
satisfy his conscience by the bare announcement of his dissent.”). 
54. Madelyn Fife et al., Concurring and Dissenting Without Opinion, 42 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 171 (2017) 
(tracing the history of noting disagreement on the Supreme Court between 1791 and 2014 and provid-
ing potential explanations for its usage); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHAL-
LENGE AND REFORM 174-75 (1999) (calling noted concurrences and dissents “nonreasoned” opinions 
that help maintain collegiality and legal certainty). 
55. But see William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 
(2015) (identifying modern instances of noting dissent in orders and summary opinions from the 
Court’s “shadow docket”).  
Differently but relatedly, lower courts sometimes depublish/unpublish opinions, which serves to 
conceal individual judicial speech. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1607, 1607 (2005) (arguing that this practice “erases from the public record an important jurisprudential 
phenomenon: judicial regret.”). 
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on the bench is via questioning during oral arguments, although little has 
been written about this practice.56  
American judges have not always and consistently spoken separately 
from the courts on which they sit. The practice has waxed and waned over 
time and has taken myriad forms, both oral and written. At times, separate 
speech on the bench has sparked controversy; at other moments, these acts 
have drawn little to no attention. More centrally, the reasons why judges 
decide to make their voices heard are manifold and likely vary over time and 
across courts. 
B. Separate Speech off the Bench 
Much like separate speech on the bench, extrajudicial speech has been 
common and contentious since the early days of the new republic.57 Early 
Supreme Court Justices followed the lead of openly partisan state judges, 
engaging in a range of political commentary, stumping for political candi-
dates, and even running for political office themselves.58 This changed after 
1810, as Justices slowly began to develop traditions of avoiding partisan ac-
tivities and became more reticent to speak publicly, for fear of rebuke by the 
press or impeachment charges launched by Congress.59 Any extrajudicial 
commentary largely focused on legal issues and judicial roles.60 Congress did 
seek to prescribe early statutory limitations on federal judicial conduct, but 
                                               
56. While there is considerable literature on the value and purpose of oral arguments, few scholars 
examine the practice of asking questions in and of itself. Some studies find that Justices pose more 
questions to and use more unpleasant language with the advocate representing the eventual losing side, 
particularly for ideological cases. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black et al., Emotions, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 73 J. POL. 572 (2011); Timothy R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do 
Justices Tip Their Hands With Questions at Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 241 (2009); LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: 
AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH (2008). A growing body of research demonstrates that Justices use oral 
argument as part of a coalition-building process, to re-evaluate their own preliminary position on the 
case, and to seek out additional information. See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON & 
JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE (2012); Ryan C. Black et al., Toward an Actor-Based Measure of 
Supreme Court Case Salience: Information-Seeking and Engagement during Oral Arguments, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 
804 (2013); TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (2004); Eve M. Ringsmuth et al., Voting Fluidity and Oral Argument on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 429 (2013). 
57. William G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 589, 591 (1989) (noting that early judges frequently “expressed their views on a wide range of 
political issues with a partisan zeal that reflected an indistinct line between the judicial and political 
spheres.”). 
58. DAVIS, supra note 41, at 36-37; Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme 
Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 637-38 (1962). 
59. Westin, supra note 58, at 641-50. 
60. Id. at 650 (“[O]ut-of-court commentary was very sparse and guarded between 1865 and the 
late 1880’s.”). 
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such limits as were adopted gave judges considerable discretion.61 Extraju-
dicial activity during the republic’s early years was thus largely guided by a 
judge’s personal ethical code.62 
The ABA sought to address this lack of ethical standardization when it 
adopted Canons of Judicial Ethics in August 1924, emphasizing principles 
of independence, impartiality, and the avoidance of impropriety.63 Most fed-
eral courts began to cite these guidelines,64 although the Supreme Court held 
that a particular canon “has of itself no binding effect on the courts but 
merely expresses the view of the [ABA].”65 Practice followed suit; extrajudi-
cial speech increased slightly after 1885 but then dropped to historic lows 
between 1920 and 1940.66 
With the large number of Franklin D. Roosevelt judicial appointees be-
tween 1937 and 1943, off-the-bench commentary by judges began to in-
crease dramatically after 1940, despite recurrent debates over judicial ethics 
and the adoption of more detailed guidelines on appropriate extrajudicial 
activity. Explanations for this shift include a changing American political 
climate, expanding judicial review and intervention in government policy-
making, and jurisprudence that increasingly addressed issues relating to sta-
tus and group rights.67  
Controversies surrounding the judicial branch re-emerged in the 1960s, 
including but not limited to Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas’s resignation 
following the revelation that he had accepted extrajudicial compensation.68 
These controversies prompted the ABA to replace its Canons with a Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted in 1972.69 The new Code permitted 
judges to speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in activities concerning 
the law and the administration of justice, but non-legal extrajudicial activities 
were permitted only insofar as they did not detract from the dignity of the 
office, interfere with judicial duties, or compromise the appearance of 
                                               
61. See Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: The Parting 
of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 272 (2007). 
62. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 292 (1987) (noting that early 
judges “felt governed by Christian ethics as expressed in the Bible.”). 
63. A.B.A, REPORT OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 65-71 (1924). 
64. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 61, at 274. 
65. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965). 
66. Ross, supra note 57, at 591; Westin, supra note 58, at 654.  
67. Westin, supra note 58, at 656. 
68. Robert F. Copple, From the Cloister to the Street: Judicial Ethics and Public Expression, 64 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 549, 560-61 (1988). 
69. New Code of Judicial Conduct is Adopted by the American Bar Association, 58 A.B.A. J. 1207, 1207 
(1972) (making a number of changes to the 1924 Canons, including mandatory language prohibiting, 
inter alia, public commentary on pending cases); see id. at 1208, canon 3A(6) (“A judge should abstain 
from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court.”). 
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impartiality.70 Moreover, the Code mandated that a “judge should refrain 
from political activity inappropriate to his judicial office,” with narrow ex-
ceptions made for judges who must compete electorally for their position.71 
Spurred in part by the Model Code’s adoption, as well as greater public scru-
tiny of government officials’ conduct, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States72 adopted its own nearly identical Code of Judicial Conduct for 
United States Judges on April 5, 1973.73 
The ABA Model Code has undergone a number of substantive revisions 
and clarifications since the 1970s.74 The Judicial Conference has also under-
taken several revisions of the federal Code, such as in 2009 when it was 
concerned with public and congressional scrutiny of judges attending pri-
vately funded seminars.75 Notably, the federal Code is a set of aspirational 
guidelines, although federal judges who fail to abide by it risk judicial disci-
pline or disqualification from a case. Moreover, it does not formally apply 
to Supreme Court Justices, even though they often consult it for guidance.76 
Despite increasing ethical scrutiny of extrajudicial speech, judges at all 
levels have frequently spoken separately and publicly on a range of topics, 
political and personal.77 They participate in off-the-bench activities such as 
giving public speeches, attending awards ceremonies, participating in 
                                               
70. Id. at 1209, canon 4. 
71. Id. at 1211-12, canon 7. 
72. Congress established the Judicial Conference in 1922 “to monitor the business of the federal 
courts.” See Judicial Conference Act of 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. 837, 837-40 (1922). 
73. Judicial Conference of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 331. The name was changed to Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges in March 1987. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES (JUD. CONF. 
OF U.S. 2019). 
74. The ABA revised the Model Code in 1990. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canons 4-5 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1990). It largely retained previous restrictions on extrajudicial activities, id. canon 4, 
and similarly mandated that a judge “shall refrain from inappropriate political activity,” id. canon 5 
(emphasis added). The 2002 Supreme Court ruling in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 
(2002), led to renewed discussion of the appropriate balance between judicial free speech and inde-
pendence, prompting the ABA to again revise its Code. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2007).  
The present Code, adopted in 2011, stipulates that a judge “shall not engage in political or 
campaign activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.” 
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). Most states have incorporated 
Model Code provisions into their own judicial codes. Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the 
Solution to Harmful Speech? Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 
262, 267-69 (2003). 
75. The Judicial Conference was concerned by “reports implying that judges who have attended 
private seminars have accepted substantial benefits from companies in litigation before them and/or 
that such companies have dictated the content of seminars.” See Lievense & Cohn, supra note 61, at 
279. The most recent Code was adopted in March 2019. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES (JUD. 
CONF. OF U.S. 2019). 
76. KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10255, A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE 
SUPREME COURT? LEGAL QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2019).  
77. Westin, supra note 58, at 635-36 (characterizing this tradition as “one of wide-ranging and 
frank out-of-court commentary.”). 
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educational programs, or teaching courses. In doing so, they rely on travel, 
speeches, and academic publications78 in order to extend their reach off the 
bench.79  
Extrajudicial speech sometimes entails personal reflections about one-
self and one’s colleagues, but much of it is educational, aimed at increasing 
public awareness of the judiciary or the judicial process. Justices today en-
gage in considerable outreach, making a public appearance nearly every 
other day80 and extensively traveling.81 They frequently use these activities 
to defend the Supreme Court as an institution and, more controversially, 
discuss recently decided cases.82 Some argue that the Court enjoys high lev-
els of public support when Justices refrain from making public and vocal 
any internal disagreements,83 yet several studies find that greater public 
awareness of the Court’s activities can in fact build its institutional legiti-
macy.84  
Judicial involvement in the business of the executive and legislative 
branches represents perhaps the most controversial form of extrajudicial 
activity, in that it is seen as “political” activity inappropriate for the judicial 
role. A striking example occurred in 1937, following President Roosevelt’s 
push for the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill (the so-called “court packing 
plan”). Then-Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote a letter to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee challenging the plan.85 The letter focused on why 
increasing the number of Court Justices would contribute to greater ineffi-
ciency, but it included a final passage which The New Republic described as 
“an advisory opinion run riot.”86 Seemingly breaching the Supreme Court’s 
                                               
78. S. Scott Gaille, Publishing by United States Court of Appeals Judges: Before and After the Bork Hearings, 
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1997) (finding that in the 1980s, a relatively high percentage of circuit court 
judges (ten to thirty percent) published at least one journal or law review article per year). 
79. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAV-
IOR 40 (2006) (“Expressions outside court can also be used to win support for judges’ conceptions of 
good judicial policy.”). 
80. Christopher N. Krewson, Save This Honorable Court: Shaping Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court 
Off the Bench, 72 POL. RSCH. Q. 686 (2018). 
81. Ryan C. Black et al., A Well-Traveled Lot: A Research Note on Judicial Travel by U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 367, 371 (2016) (finding that between 2002-2012, seventy-five percent of 
Justices’ travel was to deliver a speech).  
82. See, e.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, Beyond the Opinion: Supreme Court Justices and Extrajudicial Speech, 
88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487 (2013). 
83. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ 
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 158-59 (2002).  
84. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 649-50 (1992); Krewson, supra note 80 (finding that attending a speech 
by a Justice and exposure to news coverage of the speech improved individuals’ favorability toward the 
Justice and increased institutional loyalty toward the Court).  
85. See Richard D. Friedman, Chief Justice Hughes’ Letter on Court-Packing, 22 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 76 
(1997).  
86. The Chief Justice’s Letter, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 7, 1937, at 254.  
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position against advising on constitutional questions outside the context of 
a case, Hughes wrote that “[t]he Constitution does not appear to authorize” 
division of the Court into panels.87 While Hughes refrained from taking an 
actively political stance, the letter did give rise to commentary about appro-
priate judicial roles and highlighted the controversial nature of judicial inter-
vention in other branches of government. 
Hughes’ letter also increased news inquiries and press demands on the 
Court. Faced with such an onslaught, Hughes appointed a clerk staff mem-
ber to handle these demands, a first step in institutionalizing the Court’s 
press relations.88 The press clerk first carried out largely administrative tasks, 
then moved to advising the Justices on press relations, sending them news-
paper clippings, publishing an in-house newsletter, and proposing changes 
to Court practices to accommodate the press.89 In the 1960s and 1970s, 
“new journalism” increasingly investigated and scrutinized public officials,90 
pushing Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in 1973 to create a new, formal 
Public Information Office headed by someone with substantial journalism 
experience.91  
To be sure, judicial press relations have varied over the years and across 
individuals. During the nineteenth century, Justices were both more familiar 
with and accessible to the press than their predecessors. The media criticized 
individual Justices “at a personal level that is unusual today,”92 and unlike 
the modern era, Justices responded to such attacks directly, via letters to the 
editor, pseudonymous essays, or leaks to the press.93 This changed over the 
course of the twentieth century, as Justices began to refrain from press con-
ferences and avoid extensive interviews, even when faced with public at-
tacks.94 Still, twentieth-century Justices continued to seek to shape press 
coverage of themselves or the Court, even if not always successfully.95 Over 
the past few decades, with increasingly public profiles, today’s Justices (with 
                                               
87. Friedman, supra note 85, at 81-82. 
88. Supreme Court Gets a ‘Press Contact Man’; Appointment Was Requested by Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 1936, at 2. 
89. Jonathan Peters, Institutionalizing Press Relations at the Supreme Court: The Origins of the Public 
Information Office, 79 MO. L. REV. 985, 989-94 (2014). 
90. DAVIS, supra note 41, at 25. 
91. Peters, supra note 89, at 995, 997 (noting that in line with Burger’s approach to the press, many 
reporters saw the new head of office as working more “to preserve secrecy and to insulate the justices, 
rather than help the press.”). 
 92. DAVIS, supra note 41, at 69-71 (suggesting this was due to increasing pre-Civil War societal 
polarization and the nature of press coverage of decisions such as Dred Scott). 
93. Id. at 76-79. 
94. In the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren: “A man in politics can fight back . . . but the courts 
just can’t fight back. It isn’t in the nature of the position to do it.” Id. at 124. 
95. Id. at 123-53. 
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a few outliers) seem quite comfortable with and adept at using press cover-
age for strategic ends.96 
C. The Value of Separate Judicial Speech 
1. On the bench 
Debate over the value and propriety of separate speech has persisted 
since the foundation of the American judiciary. Judges and lawyers alike 
have long sought to silence those who hold different views and to discour-
age dissents in particular.97 As early as 1874, the Albany Law Journal wrote 
that suppressing dissent would not only economize space within reporters, 
but would further enhance “the dignity and influence” of judicial deci-
sions.98 The state of Louisiana even adopted a constitutional amendment in 
1898 prohibiting publication of dissents,99 and other states considered sim-
ilar measures.100 Opponents viewed the publication of dissents as harmful 
and inappropriate, contributing to perceptions that the law is indeterminant 
and courts are fallible.101 Dissents further risk undermining a corporate vi-
sion of the court102 and contribute to the “cult of the judge superseding the 
cult of the robe.”103 Even the Great Dissenter himself, Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes Jr., noted that they are generally “useless” and “undesirable.”104 
Perpetual dissents—the practice of continually voicing disagreement with a 
                                               
96. For example, Justice Clarence Thomas’ autobiography and subsequent press appearances have 
been portrayed as an attempt to humanize the Court and bridge the distance between the Justice and 
the broader public, with one review characterizing these appearances as attempts to “portray himself 
as a persecuted, almost Christlike figure singled out by the liberal establishment.” William Grimes, The 
Justice Looks Back and Settles Old Scores, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at E1, 9; see also DAVIS, supra note 41, 
at 176-85. 
97. Flanders, supra note 30, at 403; Kolsky, supra note 16, at 2091 (recounting a successful 
suppression of dissent in the mid-1950s, when the Pennsylvania state reporter refused to publish the 
dissenting opinion of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice). 
98. Current Topics, 10 ALB. L.J. 324, 325 (1874). 
99. The constitutional prohibition on dissent was maintained when Louisiana adopted another 
constitution in 1913, only to be removed when Louisianans adopted yet another constitution in 1921. 
See Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century Lawyers and the Dissenting Opinion, 24 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 515 (2012). 
100. Id. at 510. 
101. Id. at 517-18 (providing an overview of arguments voiced for and against publishing dissents 
during this period). 
102. C.A. Hereschoff Bartlett, Dissenting Opinions, 32 LAW MAG. & REV. Q. REV. JURIS. 54, 55 
(1906) (“[T]he legal profession wants . . . the judgments of its Courts as a united body and not the 
individual opinions of judges.”).  
103. JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT 64 (1987); see also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 72 (1958) (claiming that a dissenting opinion “cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity 
on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.”). 
104. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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decision years after it has become precedent—perhaps exhibit these tenden-
cies to the extreme.105 
Critiques of separate opinion writing continue to this day, particularly 
for dissents viewed as unnecessary or superfluous. Yet judges and commen-
tators widely view separate opinion writing as a healthy and democratic prac-
tice that contributes to the strength of the judiciary. Publication of dissents 
may even be required by democratic norms of transparency and publicity.106 
Considerable scholarly writing has thus been dedicated to cataloguing the 
roles and values of separate opinions.107  
Most commentators agree that one of the primary values of a dissent 
rests with its future corrective power,108 in that it reveals perceived flaws in 
the majority’s legal analysis “in the hope that the Court will mend the error 
of its ways in a later case.”109 While this occurs relatively infrequently, such 
“great dissents” are lauded as demonstrating the “power of a single justice 
to shape future decisions while preserving the moral righteousness of the 
court.”110 Such is the case with Justice John Marshall Harlan’s lone dissent 
in the racial segregation case of Plessy v. Ferguson111 that eventually carried the 
                                               
105. Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447, 449 (2008) (arguing that 
issuing perpetual dissents is akin to “pursuing a sort of ‘self stare decisis’ – elevating . . . commitment 
to an internally consistent jurisprudence over a commitment to adhere faithfully to the Court’s 
precedents.”). 
106. See, e.g., Notes: Dissenting Opinions, 20 AM. L. REV. 428, 429 (1886) (noting that publication is 
required by a “fundamental principle of Anglo-American law that the courts of justice shall be open.”); 
Carter, supra note 30, at 118 (“The right to dissent is the essence of democracy—the will to dissent is 
an effective safeguard against judicial lethargy—the effect of a dissent is the essence of progress.”); 
Emlin McLain, Dissenting Opinions, 14 YALE L.J. 191, 192 (1905) (arguing that non-publication “would 
probably lead to the disquieting belief that the real uncertainties of litigation are much more numerous 
and dangerous.”). 
107. See, e.g., Altimari, supra note 30, at 279-84; ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT 
DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENTERS IN THE SUPREME COURT 3-21 (1974); William J. Brennan, Jr., In 
Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430, 435 (1986); Carter, supra note 30, at 118-19, 121; Flanders, 
supra note 30, at 406-08, 410; Fuld, supra note 30, at 927-28; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing 
Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 143, 145 (1990); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 6 (2010); Kolsky, supra note 16, at 2082; Lipez, supra note 26, at 322-27; 
Pound, supra note 53, at 795; Voss, supra note 30, at 653-57; Wood, supra note 30, at 1454-56.  
108. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 36 (4th prtg. 1938) (“The dissenter speaks to the future, and his voice is pitched to a key 
that will carry through the years.”). 
109. Brennan, supra note 107, at 430. As Hughes famously wrote, “[a] dissent in a court of last 
resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later 
decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been 
betrayed.” CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 68 (1928). 
110. Randall T. Shepard, What Can Dissents Teach Us?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 337, 338 (2005); see also 
MARK TUSHNET, I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES, 
at xxii-xxiv (2008) (identifying vindication by the future as a characteristic of great dissents). 
111. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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day in Brown v. Board of Education112 more than a half-century later.113 Dissents 
within lower appeals courts may similarly play a future corrective role by 
signaling to higher courts cases worthy of reconsideration and pointing out 
perceived flaws in the majority’s reasoning.114 Indeed, circuit court decisions 
are more likely to be reviewed en banc when a dissent has been filed115 and 
“often times the dissent serves as the blueprint for a new majority opin-
ion.”116 
Separate opinions are further viewed as safeguarding the integrity of the 
judicial decision-making process by keeping the majority accountable for its 
rationale, something Karl Llewellyn dubbed “rid[ing] herd on the major-
ity.”117 Justice William J. Brennan lauds separate opinions for contributing 
to the quality of the majority opinion by “forcing the prevailing side to deal 
with the hardest questions urged by the losing side.”118 Relatedly, separate 
opinions can act as “damage control” mechanisms, in that they “emphasize 
the limits of a majority decision that sweeps, so far as the dissenters are 
concerned, unnecessarily broadly.”119 
Separate opinions often provide practical guidance for litigants, other 
courts, and Congress.120 They also serve symbolic values, in that they may 
assuage the losing side and serve to “dissipate the anger of those who felt 
disenfranchised by the majority opinion.”121 Judges further point to the sym-
bolic value of separate opinions as a form of self-expression and as “an an-
tidote for judicial lethargy.”122 As for oral dissents, Lani Guinier highlights 
                                               
112. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
113. Brennan, supra note 107, at 430-32 (quoting Alan Barth calling such dissenters “Prophets 
with Honor” and pointing to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy as an example of the “quintessential voice 
crying in the wilderness.”). 
114. Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, How the Dissent Becomes the Majority: Using Federalism to Transform 
Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, 59 DUKE L.J. 183, 238 (2009). 
115. See, e.g., Beim & Kastellec, supra note 43, at 1075-76 (finding that majority-inconsistent death 
penalty decisions are more likely to be reviewed en banc when there is a dissent); Tracey E. George, 
The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 250, 260 
(1999) (finding that between 1956 and 1996, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits were nearly thirty-
nine times more likely to review en banc a divided panel decision compared to a unanimous one); 
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 
1047 (1991) (finding that between 1987 and 1990, the D.C. Circuit was eighteen times more likely to 
grant en banc review of a non-unanimous panel decision than a unanimous one). 
116. Altimari, supra note 30, at 279. 
117. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960). 
118. Brennan, supra note 107, at 430. 
119. Id. 
120. Id.; see also Indraneel Sur, How Far Do Voices Carry: Dissents from Denial of Rehearing En Banc, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (noting that circuit panel dissents often “telegraph to other courts, 
litigants, and the legislature that the majority’s reasoning is incorrect.”).  
121. Altimari, supra note 30, at 282 (quoting Edward C. Voss, Dissent: Sign of a Healthy Court, 24 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 655 (1992)). 
122. Fuld, supra note 30, at 927. 
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their dialogue-enhancing value, in that justices may use them to engage with 
the public in a democratically deliberative manner.123  
2. Off the bench 
 As with separate on-the-bench speech, there exists considerable norma-
tive debate about the appropriateness of extrajudicial speech. Commitment 
to judicial independence has led many to argue against public, extrajudicial 
speech.124 Critics express a variety of concerns with such activities, such as 
the need to preserve public respect for the judiciary, maintain separation of 
powers, and ensure impartial judicial proceedings. Further, the fact that 
much extrajudicial speech is autobiographical and personalized potentially 
undermines the ideal of impersonal justice and the belief that we “live under 
a government of laws, not of men,”125 although no empirical evidence sup-
ports the contention that extrajudicial speech undermines the judiciary’s le-
gitimacy.126 
 Still, debate and critiques persist, particularly for activities that seem to 
straddle the line between judicial propriety and impropriety. For example, 
in the 1980s and 1990s, public and media allegations of judicial non-inde-
pendence generated vigorous discussion among members of the bar about 
the appropriateness of judges publicly responding to such critiques. The 
widely held view of the legal profession was that judges “are to sit silently 
on the sidelines even in the face of false and vitriolic attacks directed at their 
integrity and impartiality.”127 Although judges in the early days of the repub-
lic frequently spoke extrajudicially to defend themselves,128 many judges 
now view extrajudicial silence in these instances as ethically imperative129 
and perhaps even required by the Code of Judicial Conduct.130 As Judge 
                                               
123. Guinier, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing the democracy-enhancing potential of oral dissents). 
124. See, e.g., Dean Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A. J. 919, 920 (1969) 
(“The most important extrajudicial assignments distract from judicial tasks, and lesser ones may bring 
involvement in controversies detracting from judicial impartiality and aloofness.”); Black et al., supra 
note 81, at 367 (noting the normative debate over private judicial travel). 
125. Schmidt, supra note 82, at 520-21. 
126. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
127. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., On a Judge’s Duty to Speak Extrajudicially: Rethinking the Strategy of 
Silence, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 679, 681 (1999); see also Ross, supra note 57. 
128. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  
129. Fortunato, supra note 127, at 689; Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence 
and Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 714 (1997) (expressing her view as Chief Judge 
of the New York State Court of Appeals that “judges are bound to silence when facing their critics 
about particular cases.”).  
130. Roy D. Simon, Jr. & Karen E. Baldwin, Interview: A Unique Perspective on Judicial Independence, 
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 801 (1997) (interviewing United States District Court Judge Harold Baer, 
who is quoted as stating that judges are “not permitted to fight back under the Code of Judicial 
Conduct”). 
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Guido Calabresi of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit has put it: “silence is the price of life tenure.”131 
 A minority of commentators takes the opposite view: judges have both 
a right and an obligation to respond directly to personal attacks,132 and that 
doing so is beneficial for their own accountability, as well as the integrity of 
the judiciary.133 To remain silent leaves the public dissemination of infor-
mation on the judiciary “to people who are often neither informed nor con-
cerned about this branch of government.”134 This is particularly the case 
when such attacks are not credible or are inaccurately reported by the 
press.135 In fact, since the earliest days of the Court, Justices have strategi-
cally engaged in public relations in the face of such external threats and at-
tacks to defend the institution and, more recently, themselves.136  
 At times, the value of such extrajudicial defenses—in addition to at-
tempts to humanize the judiciary and personalize judges—may be far greater 
than the costs incurred by perceptions of judicial impropriety. Yet debates 
about the added value of separate judicial speech in the United States—both 
on and off the bench—occur insulated from the activities of domestic 
judges’ international counterparts. In turn, the dialogue-enhancing value of 
separate speech and its potential for increasing deliberative engagement is 
largely ignored by international judges now faced with increasing public 
backlash. The next Part turns to these international experiences in order to 
bring these two domains into conversation. 
III. JUDICIAL SPEECH IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
Despite the exponential increase in international tribunals and dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the past few decades, literature on courts’ internal 
decision-making processes remains in its infancy. This Part will describe (1) 
the extent to which rules in various international courts permit, cabin, or 
encourage judges to speak separately, (2) the ways in which judges have used 
the ability to speak separately both on and off the bench, and (3) the values 
implicated by the phenomenon of separate international judicial speech. In-
ternational courts vary considerably in their treatment of these issues, and a 
comprehensive account of the norms and practice at every single tribunal 
                                               
131. Michael Daly Hawkins, Dining with the Dogs: Reflections on the Criticism of Judges, 57 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1353, 1354 (1996). 
132. Fortunato, supra note 127, at 681. 
133. Schmidt, supra note 82, at 522. 
134. Fortunato, supra note 127, at 687.  
135. For instance, after being subjected to blogger accusations of lying in his confirmation 
process, Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. voiced concern that judicial independence is threatened and public 
confidence undermined by such false media reports. See Michael Scholl, Alito Fears ‘Real Damage’ from 
Attacks on Judges, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 2, 2006, at 1, 1-3. 
136. DAVIS, supra note 41, at 181, 185. 
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would be neither feasible nor useful. This Part will therefore focus on a 
sample of the most visible mechanisms that cover a range of substantive 
areas of law, while simultaneously reflecting institutional variance.  
A. Rules on Separate Judicial Speech 
 With a few limited, but important, exceptions, the busiest and most 
prominent international courts countenance the possibility of judges speak-
ing separately in the form of concurring and dissenting opinions. This Part 
highlights the different models of individual opinions permitted—or more 
exceptionally, discouraged—in: (a) courts of general jurisdiction (the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ)); (b) global bodies with limited subject matter 
jurisdiction (the dispute settlement panels and Appellate Body of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Criminal Court (ICC)); (c) 
influential regional courts with large caseloads (the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (EC-
tHR)); and (d) ad hoc dispute settlement mechanisms, such as arbitral tribu-
nals.  
 Given its pedigree as the successor to the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ) and its status as the “world court,” it is not surprising 
that the ICJ’s position on individual judicial speech has been much debated 
and has formed a benchmark for subsequent tribunals. The framework gov-
erning separate opinions at the ICJ borrows heavily from the law and prac-
tice of the PCIJ, which proved repeatedly controversial during various revi-
sions to its Statute and Rules.137 Eventually, the PCIJ permitted individual 
opinions in all types of cases (contentious as well as advisory), agreed on 
publishing the number of votes in the judgment, and banned the practice of 
issuing “secret” dissents.138 
                                               
137. R. P. Anand, The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication, 14 INT’L 
& COMPAR. L.Q. 788, 796-98 (1965) (describing the negotiations during the 1926 Conference for the 
Revision of Rules of the Court and the 1929 Conference of the Committee of Jurists, which proposed 
a range of solutions, from an outright ban on dissenting opinions to making public the number of 
judges in the majority without revealing the names of individual dissenters). 
138. Id. at 796, 798; Edward Dumbauld, Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication, 90 U. PA. 
L. REV. 929, 943-44 (1942) (noting that the practice of filing “secret dissenting opinions with the 
minutes of the Court’s deliberations” was initially abandoned by a resolution passed by the court). 
Interestingly, dissenting and concurring opinions were not introduced simultaneously at the PCIJ. See 
Farrokh Jhabvala, The Scope of Individual Opinions in the World Court, 13 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 33, 35-36 
(1982) (describing how separate opinions were introduced later by the judges in the 1920s and were 
only given a firm constitutional foundation with the passage of the 1945 Statute of the ICJ).  
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 Following the PCIJ, ICJ judges have the right, but not an obligation, to 
deliver separate opinions.139 While the initial Rules of Court resembled the 
PCIJ in not requiring identification of the judges in the majority, they were 
amended in 1978 to provide that the judgment must contain the “number 
and names of the judges constituting the majority,” effectively revealing the 
identity of judges not part of the majority.140  
 ICJ judges retain considerable leeway as to the form and content of sep-
arate opinions, though they have sought to limit their discretion in this re-
spect. In 1948, the court clarified that while a “dissenting opinion” repre-
sents a disagreement with the judgment or advisory opinion, an “individual 
opinion” is reserved for cases where the judge supports the decision, but 
not the reasoning, of the majority.141 What constitutes a “declaration” has 
been more difficult to determine, with judges using “declarations” as a ve-
hicle for a variety of opinions.142 Amongst the explanations offered for the 
eclectic use of declarations is that they are published immediately after the 
court’s decision, followed by concurrences and dissents, always in order of 
the judge’s seniority. Thus, merely by labelling their separate opinion a “dec-
laration,” a judge could have her individual opinion published ahead of more 
senior colleagues.143 
 Mirroring the ICJ’s legal framework,144 the ECtHR permits judges who 
do not agree with any part of the judgment to deliver “either a separate 
opinion, concurring with or dissenting from that judgment,” or a “bare 
                                               
139. Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs art. 95 (“Any judge may . . . attach his individual 
opinion to the judgment, whether he dissents from the majority or not; a judge who wishes to record 
his concurrence or dissent without stating his reasons may do so in the form of a declaration.”). 
140. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 255 
(2017). 
141. Anand, supra note 137, at 788. 
142. Farrokh Jhabvala, Declarations by Judges of the International Court of Justice, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 830, 
835-37, 841-45 (1978). Historically, a declaration was intended to cover cases where the judge was 
inclined to issue a brief statement of dissent without elaborating his reasoning. However, in the first 
few decades of the court’s existence, declarations took the place of partially reasoned dissenting and 
concurring statements, additional remarks, attacks on concurring and dissenting statements, and even 
fully reasoned dissents. Id. 
143. Id. at 853. This judicial practice prompted the introduction of Article 95(2) of the Rules of 
Court in 1978. Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs art. 95. However, as the subsequent practice 
of declarations at the ICJ demonstrates, this change to the Rules has not had the desired effect. See, e.g., 
Jadhav (India v. Pak.), Judgment, 2019 I.C.J. 418, 494, 510, 520 (July 17) (separate opinions by 
Sebutinde, J., Robinson, J. & Iwasawa, J.) (containing reasoned individual “declarations” by Judges 
Sebutinde, Robinson, and Iwasawa); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 240 (July 9) (declaration by 
Buergenthal, J.) (appearing as a declaration although it is effectively a dissent).  
144. See Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 140, at 249-50 (noting the drafting history of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular Article 1 of the draft Statute, which explicitly 
stated that it is “based on the Statute of the International Court of Justice”). 
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statement of dissent.”145 ECtHR judges are thus free to dissent without be-
ing under any obligation to out themselves as dissenters. Individual opinions 
are also permitted, though by no means encouraged, at the ICC.146 While no 
explicit provision on separate opinions exists for the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
judges in the Trial Chamber are encouraged to strive for unanimity, failing 
which a decision shall be taken by majority vote.147 The corresponding pro-
vision for the Appeals Chamber omits a preference for unanimity, stating 
that the “judgement of the Appeals Chamber shall contain the views of the 
majority and the minority, but a judge may deliver a separate or dissenting 
opinion on a question of law.”148 The difference in wording has led some to 
argue that separate opinions are intended to be discouraged at the Trial 
Chamber, and that minority and majority views may even be featured in one 
single decision rather than being appended separately.149  
 Other international courts, especially those dealing with international 
commercial or economic law, appear more reluctant to embrace individual 
opinions. Barring a few instances, arbitration rules neither encourage, nor 
prohibit, separate opinions. This silence is especially pronounced in interna-
tional commercial arbitration.150 For example, the Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration drafted by the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) refrains from providing any 
                                               
145. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 49, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221; Eur. Ct. H.R., Rules of Court, rule 74(2) (1959) (as amended Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf.  
146. Nina Jorgensen & Alexander Zahar, Deliberation, Dissent, Judgment, in INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1151, 1178-79 (Göran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013) 
(referring to the drafting history of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which suggests that some countries 
favored unanimous opinions). International criminal law, in general, has always countenanced the 
possibility of separate opinions as evidenced by the practice at different international and hybrid courts: 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (S.C. Res. 827, art. 23(2) (May 25, 
1993)); the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (S.C. Res. 955, art. 22(2) (Nov. 8, 1994)); the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. on the Establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, art. 18, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000)); and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (S.C. 
Res. 1757, art. 23 (May 30, 2007)). 
147. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 74(3), 74(5), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
148. Id. art. 83(4). 
149. See Göran Sluiter, Separate and Dissenting Opinions, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 510, 511 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009); Otto Triffterer, Article 74, 
in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1387, 1398 
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008). However, the Trial Chamber has interpreted its freedom more 
broadly in this respect. See infra Section II.B.1. 
150. Peter J. Rees & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can They Fulfil a Beneficial Role?, 25 ARB. 
INT’L 329, 331 (2009) (on the absence of specific rules on separate opinions in national and 
international laws and regulations); Hans-Patrick Schroeder & Tanja V. Pfitzner, Recent Trends Regarding 
Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration, 2 Y.B. ON INT’L ARB. 133, 135 (2012) (“[T]he 
absence of regulation does not imply that dissenting opinions were impermissible.”).  
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specific rule.151 This was also the official stance of the 1985 Working Party 
on Dissenting Opinions and Interim and Partial Awards established by the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s Commission on International Arbi-
tration.152 In the event of a dissent, it is left to the discretion of the Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce to either attach the 
separate opinion to the arbitral award or refuse to do so, on the grounds 
that it might negatively impact the award’s validity and enforceability.153  
 In comparison, international investment treaties adopt a more liberal 
stance towards individual opinions, even as norms in international invest-
ment arbitration generally favour unanimity.154 Prominent international reg-
ulations that explicitly recognize individual opinions include the 1965 Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States (ICSID Convention) and the Rules of the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal.155  
 A strong preference for unanimity also appears in the rules for dispute 
settlement at the WTO, as set out in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).156 For the first instance three-member dispute panels, the DSU does 
not explicitly provide a right to issue a separate opinion; rather it stipulates 
                                               
151. HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND 
COMMENTARY 837 (1989); see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, ¶ 
43, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008) (“It may be added that the Model Law neither requires nor prohibits 
‘dissenting opinions.’”). 
152. Final Report on Dissenting and Separate Opinions, 2 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 32 (1991) (“[I]t is 
neither practical nor desirable to attempt to suppress dissenting opinions in ICC arbitrations . . . the 
prevailing view was that the ICC should neither encourage nor discourage the giving of such 
opinions.”). 
153. Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration, 15 
MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 16, 18 (2000). 
154. See, e.g., Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields - Lecture Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial 
Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT’L 223, 242 (2004) (“[T]he time has perhaps come 
to enquire whether the present leniency towards dissenting opinions . . . has gone too far.”). This charge 
of excessive leniency is leveled despite the fact that separate opinions are relatively infrequent in 
investment arbitration. See Ruth Breeze, Dissenting and Concurring Opinions in International Investment 
Arbitration: How the Arbitrators Frame Their Need to Differ, 25 INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 393, 396 (2012) 
(“[U]nanimity is highly desirable in arbitration procedures, and opting to put one’s dissent on record is 
a last resort.”); Catharine Titi, Investment Arbitration and the Controverted Right of the Arbitrator to Issue a 
Separate or Dissenting Opinion, 17 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 197, 197 (2018) (“Although 
dissents are not generally encouraged in international arbitration, they are a reality of investment treaty 
disputes.”). 
155. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States art. 48(4), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), rule 47(3) (2006); Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., Tribunal Rules of Procedure, art. 
32(3) (1983).  
156. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
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that individual opinions expressed in panel reports must be anonymous.157 
This formulation is repeated in DSU provisions for appellate review by the 
standing Appellate Body (AB).158 However, the AB has drafted its own 
Working Procedures for Appellate Review that depart from this neutral 
stance and encourage Members to “make every effort to take their decisions 
by consensus.”159 The first AB Members took this admonition to heart and 
went even further in reaching a mutual commitment “not to render any sep-
arate opinion” so as to build the legitimacy of a new system.160 
 The requirement of anonymous opinions is intended to preserve the 
confidentiality of the dispute settlement process and keep the focus on the 
objective merits of the arguments and reasoning, while simultaneously pre-
venting Members from using the opinion as a platform for airing their per-
sonal agendas.161 Additionally, it is expected that the anonymity criterion 
shields the opinion writer from undue political pressure by member states, 
especially when it comes to reappointment to the AB. 
 Among the courts surveyed in this Article, the CJEU is unique in com-
pletely eschewing all forms of separate opinions.162 Various historical and 
institutional reasons have been given for this absolute prohibition. The 
CJEU is modeled heavily on the French judicial system, where all decisions 
are considered to be made and delivered in the name of the court as an 
institution, rather than by the individuals comprising the court.163 Moreover, 
supporters of unanimous decision-making argue that these judgments are 
complemented by the opinion of the CJEU’s Advocate General (AG), 
                                               
157. Id. art. 14(3). 
158. The Appellate Body is a seven-member standing body which sits in three-member Divisions 
to decide on appeals. Id. art. 17.  
159. Id. art. 17(11); Working Procedures for Appellate Review, art. 3(2), WTO Doc. 
WT/AB/WP/6 (adopted Aug. 16, 2010). 
160. See Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 140, at 265; A.V. Ganesan, The Appellate Body in its Formative 
Years: A Personal Perspective, in A HISTORY OF LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE GATT/WTO 517, 531 
(Gabrielle Marceau ed., 2015); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO, 6 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 695, 697 (2003) (“[T]he spirit of Rule 3.2 first sentence of the Working Procedure has 
clearly prevailed over the possibility offered by Article 17.11 DSU.”). 
161. James Flett, Collective Intelligence and the Possibility of Dissent: Anonymous Individual Opinions in 
WTO Jurisprudence, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 287, 307-08 (2010). 
162. The requirement of a unanimous judgment is based on an interpretation of Protocol (No 3) 
on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 218, art. 36 (“Judgments 
shall state the reasons on which they are based. They shall contain the names of the Judges who took 
part in the deliberations.”). 
163. Sophie Turenne, Advocate Generals’ Opinions or Separate Opinions: Judicial Engagement in the CJEU, 
14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 723, 727 (2012); Iyiola Solanke, The Advocate General: Assisting 
the CJEU of Article 13 TEU to Secure Trust and Democracy, 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 697, 
705 (2012) (describing this institutional posture as “corporatist” in contrast with courts that adopt a 
more deliberative style).  
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which forms an adequate substitute for the role normally performed by sep-
arate opinions.164 
 The AG’s opinion is functionally and institutionally quite distinct from 
a judicial separate opinion. The AG does not participate in the deliberations 
of the court, and the Opinion—rendered after the hearing and prior to the 
close of deliberations—is not legally binding.165 Rather, it is advisory in na-
ture and merely intended to assist the CJEU in its own deliberations.166 As 
such, the Opinion’s reach remains tied to and constrained by the CJEU’s 
terse style of argumentation.167 In practice, while studies have shown that 
the AG’s Opinion has been moderately influential in the CJEU’s decision-
making, the CJEU has also departed from the AG’s reasoning or failed to 
acknowledge points raised in the Opinion altogether.168 
B. The Phenomenon of Separate Judicial Speech 
International rules on individual opinions provide the governing frame-
work, but the exercise of the freedom to speak separately varies markedly, 
shaped by factors such as institutional culture, political pressure, career in-
centives, and personal inclinations and preferences. Similarly, differences in 
professional backgrounds results in a wide range of practices by judges opin-
ing on legal and institutional issues not within their official capacity.    
1. The rise and rise of individual opinions 
 ICJ judges are perhaps the most prolific users of separate opinions, and 
continuing in the tradition of the PCIJ, they have exercised this right since 
                                               
164. This position has been articulated by both former Advocates General and judges of the 
CJEU. See Walter van Gerven, The Role and Structure of the European Judiciary Now and in the Future, 21 
EUR. L. REV. 211, 222 (1996); Francis Jacobs, Advocates General and Judges in the European Court of Justice: 
Some Personal Reflections, in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 17, 21-22 (David O’Keeffe 
ed., 2000); Josef Azizi, Unveiling the EU Courts’ Internal Decision-Making Process: A Case for Dissenting 
Opinions?, 12 ERA F. 49, 59, 63 (2011) (“[T]he submission of the Advocate General certainly has not 
the character of a separate opinion . . . but – since it is mostly very profound and well reflected – it still 
helps the parties and third persons to put—by contrast—some light upon possible unclear passages of 
the later judgment.”).  
165. Azizi, supra note 164, at 63; Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 
VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 355-56 (2009) (pointing out the reasons for not treating AG Opinions as the 
functional equivalent of separate opinions).  
166. MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 115-41 (2004) (identifying ways in which AG 
Opinions may assist the CJEU, by summarizing and assessing the strength of the case law and 
referencing principles and doctrines relevant to the dispute). 
167. Turenne, supra note 163, at 734; see also Perju, supra note 165, at 340 (arguing that the AG’s 
Opinion is not a substitute for separate opinions because what is required is open contestation amongst 
judges and a public defense of the majority judgment).  
168. Turenne, supra note 163, at 734 (referring to the “practice of the Court to not comment on 
novel points raised solely by the AG and not by the parties”); Solanke, supra note 163, at 698.  
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the earliest days of the court.169 Indeed, a unanimous judgment is a vanish-
ingly rare phenomenon at the ICJ.170 Individual opinions cover the whole 
gamut of issues, from fact to law to policy, and are not always limited to 
expressions of support or disagreement with the reasoning or decision of 
the majority. Rather they are “polyphonic” and can be fairly discursive in 
character, touching upon a range of matters that are not, strictly speaking, 
within the scope of dispute.171  
 Some suggest that the nature of the ICJ’s internal deliberative process 
helps to account for the large number of separate opinions, in that each ICJ 
judge drafts tentative opinions for circulation prior to collective delibera-
tions.172 This practice may result in significant amendments to the majority 
view, which take into account or respond to minority positions. But it also 
incentivizes a judge in the minority—who has already spent the time and 
energy to draft an opinion—to then finalize and publish her opinion sepa-
rately.173 National bias for one’s “home country” or for countries with sim-
ilar political and cultural characteristics may also lead a judge on the losing 
side to publish her separate opinion.174 
 The ECtHR follows closely behind the ICJ’s near perfect record of judg-
ments with individual opinions, with estimates ranging from between sixty 
to eighty percent of ECtHR cases including at least one separate opinion.175 
Several studies have sought to identify the factors that contribute to ECtHR 
judges’ propensity to write separately. National bias has been suggested as a 
                                               
169. Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 140, at 256; see also Anand, supra note 137, at 789 (noting that 
the PCIJ delivered only three unanimous judgments in thirty five contentious cases and fifteen 
unanimous opinions in twenty five advisory opinions over the course of its tenure).  
170. Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 140, at 256 (“[I]n its first 243 decisions (90 judgments, 25 
advisory opinions, 128 orders), the Court also released 1,017 individual opinions, including 349 
dissenting opinions, 406 separate opinions, and 262 declarations.”). 
171. See Hemi Mistry, ‘The Different Sets of Ideas at the Back of Our Heads’: Dissent and Authority at the 
International Court of Justice, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 293, 296-97 (2019). 
172. Id. at 311 (referring to the internal ICJ procedure established under Resolution Concerning 
the Internal Judicial Practice of the Court, 1976 I.C.J. Acts & Docs art. 4).  
173. See Mistry, supra note 171, at 311-12. 
174. Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 599, 624 (2005) (analyzing all ICJ opinions from 1946 to Mar. 1, 2004 to argue that ICJ 
judges “vote for their home states about 90 percent of the time”).  
175. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: Causes and 
Consequences (Mar. 5-7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://aei.pitt.edu/78999/1/Dunoff. 
Pollack.pdf; Robin C.A. White & Iris Boussiakou, Separate Opinions in the European Court of Human Rights, 
9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 37, 53 (2009) (conducting a more fine-grained analysis to show that, in the period 
from 1999 to 2004, roughly twenty-five percent of judgments at the ECtHR were unanimous, fifteen 
percent had at least one dissenting opinion, and sixty percent at least one concurrence). As scholars 
have pointed out, the rates of dissent are higher in the seventeen-member Grand Chamber, which only 
hears exceptional cases. See Fred J. Bruinsma, The Room at the Top: Separate Opinions in the Grand Chambers 
of the ECHR (1998-2006), ANCILLA IURIS 32, 33 (2008) (analyzing data from ECtHR judgments 
between 1960 and 1997 to conclude that seventy-eight percent of all Grand Chamber judgments and 
forty-two percent of all Chamber judgments featured separate opinions). 
 
2020] SEPARATE JUDICIAL SPEECH 29 
 
contributing factor, with studies indicating that judges from the respondent 
state tend to dissent more frequently. However, this practice is more com-
mon for ad hoc judges appointed only for specific cases than it is for elected 
judges.176 There are very few instances of sole dissenting opinions by the 
national judge, which weakens the claim of proxy voting by states.177 Studies 
on this topic also suggest a number of cultural and behavioral factors. For 
instance, judges from pre-enlargement member states (i.e. Western Europe) 
tend to append more separate opinions, as do judges with an activist back-
ground in human rights lawyering.178     
 Similar reasoning has been offered to explain rising dissents in invest-
ment arbitration. Several empirical studies demonstrate that roughly a fifth 
of all published cases in investment arbitration include a separate or dissent-
ing opinion.179 The conduct of arbitral proceedings varies widely across pan-
els. While some presiding arbitrators convene and exchange views with fel-
low panelists throughout the proceedings, others ask for written notes from 
each party-appointed arbitrator and then express their preference for one or 
the other side without following a deliberative process. The arbitrator whose 
reasoning is not necessarily taken into account may then feel motivated to 
                                               
176. Fred J. Bruinsma & Matthijs de Blois, Rules of Law from Westport to Wladiwostok. Separate 
Opinions in the European Court of Human Rights, 15 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 175, 181-82 (1997) (analyzing 
court judgements from 1991 to 1995 to conclude that, with the exception of ad hoc judges, ECtHR 
judges do not exhibit a strong national bias); Bruinsma, supra note 175, at 37-39 (suggesting that ad hoc 
judges may not feel solidarity with or peer pressure from their fellow judges in the same way as elected 
judges); see also Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human 
Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 430 (2008) (“[A]lthough there is strong evidence that ECtHR 
judges displayed more national bias on politically sensitive Article 3 cases, the overall effect of career 
motivations on the behavior of ECtHR judges appears modest.”). 
177. White & Boussiakou, supra note 175, at 52-53. 
178. Bruinsma, supra note 175, at 40-42; White & Boussiakou, supra note 175, at 57 (reporting that 
judges themselves also seem to think that prior professional background—in academia, civil service, 
or the judiciary—might influence the likelihood of writing a separate opinion); Voeten, supra note 176, 
at 430 (arguing that ECtHR judges are motivated by policy considerations, with judges from former 
socialist countries more likely to find violations by their own and other socialist governments, and 
judges who were formerly private practitioners more likely to find violations compared to diplomats 
and non-private practitioners). 
179. Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN 824 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011) (showing that, as of 2011, dissents 
were issued in 34 out of 150 published ICSID arbitration awards and that nearly all 34 were issued by 
the arbitrator appointed by the party on the losing side); Titi, supra note 154, at 198 (“About one in five 
cases includes at least one separate or dissenting opinion.”); Anton Strezhnev, You Only Dissent Once: 
Re-Appointment and Legal Practices in Investment Arbitration 2 (Nov. 8, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/astrezhnev/files/dissent_draft_1.pdf (coding ICSID 
cases from 1972–2015 to claim that roughly 80% were unanimous, with a dissenting opinion in only 
about 14.5% of decisions). 
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pen a dissenting opinion. This is often the case for the arbitrator appointed 
by the party on the losing side of the dispute.180  
 Notwithstanding the small number of cases handled by the ICC, sepa-
rate opinions also seem to be an increasingly significant fixture at all levels 
of the judicial process. Despite the Rome Statute’s clear preference for una-
nimity at the Trial level, only two Trial Chamber judgments have ever been 
rendered unanimously. Every other judgment has been accompanied by 
concurring, “minority,” and dissenting opinions.181 Scholars suggest that the 
Appeals Chamber seems to display a fair amount of consensus, with a not-
insignificant number of its decisions rendered unanimously.182 A few outlier 
Appeals Chamber judges, such as Judge Anita Usacka and Judge Giorgios 
Pickis, have been responsible for a disproportionate number of separate 
opinions.183 However, the majority of Appeals Chamber judgments contain 
at least one separate opinion, including the recent Bemba case, with its pro-
fuse and high-profile dissents and concurrences.184 
                                               
180. van den Berg, supra note 179, at 830 (suggesting that, in fact, the party-appointed arbitrator 
is expected to dissent in favor of the party that loses the case); cf. Strezhnev, supra note 179, at 5 
(surveying ICSID awards to conclude that “by bearing the social costs of dissent, arbitrators credibly 
signal their support for a party’s position and increase their chances of being re-appointed by that party 
in the future even as they forego more prestigious appointments as presiding member.”). But see Charles 
N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson–van den Berg 
Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, 29 ARB. INT’L 7, 29 (2013) 
(“A number of the dissents in van den Berg’s survey . . . are benign or actually disfavor the party that 
appointed the dissenter.”).  
181. Of the unanimous judgments, one involves a confession (Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-
01/12-01/15-171, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 3 (Sept. 27, 2016)) and the other deals with offenses 
related to the obstruction of justice (Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 15 (Oct. 19, 2016)). All other judgments have been accompanied 
by at least one separate opinion: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Fulford (Apr. 5, 2012); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Benito (Apr. 5, 2012); Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343-AnxI, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Steiner (Mar. 21, 2016); Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343-AnxII, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Ozaki (Mar. 21, 2016); Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-4, 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert (Dec. 18, 2012); Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3436-tENG, Minority Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert (Mar. 7, 2017); Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Concurring Opinion of Judges Diarra and Cotte (Mar. 7, 
2017); Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15-1234, Dissenting Opinion to the Chamber’s Oral 
Decision of 15 January 2019 (Jan. 15, 2019) (with Judge Carbuccia writing the Dissenting Opinion). 
182. WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 316 
(5th ed. 2017). 
183. Id. 
184. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/-06-3121-Anx2, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against His Conviction, at 6 (Dec. 1, 2014) (noting the Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Ušacka and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Song); Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-
02/12-271-AnxA, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II 
Entitled “Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” at 6 (Apr. 7, 2015) (noting the Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Trendafilova and Tarfusser); Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13-2275-Anx, 
Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Mr Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Mr Fidèle Babala Wandu and Mr Narcisse Arido Against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber VII Entitled “Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” ¶ 1631 (Mar. 8, 2018) 
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 In contrast to these tribunals, the strong norm for consensus decision-
making at the WTO has led to remarkably few separate opinions.185 Several 
legal, institutional, cultural, and cognitive factors have contributed to this 
result. At the Appellate level, working procedures encourage collegiality and 
consensus decision-making,186 with all seven AB Members—including the 
three Division Members in charge of hearing the case and conducting the 
process—exchanging views and deliberating on a given dispute.187 This car-
ries over to the drafting of the report by the three Division Members sitting 
on the dispute, each of whom bears equal responsibility for the drafting 
process.188  
 Notwithstanding the normative and procedural pressures for unanimity, 
occasional differences of opinion are bound to emerge on contentious is-
sues. The near complete absence of separate opinions in the AB of the WTO 
thus may be further due to internal self-policing by AB Members. The initial 
agreement to refrain from dissents has been followed by a strong institu-
tional culture in favor of conformity, bolstered by the Members’ desire to 
avoid costs such as increased work-load under tight time pressure and po-
tential loss of collegiality.189 In the rare instances where they do appear, sep-
arate opinions tend to be fairly brief and are typically subsumed within the 
body of the report instead of being appended at the end or as a separate 
                                               
(noting the Separate Opinion of Judge Henderson); Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 753 (Mar. 21, 2016) (noting the Separate Opinions 
by Judges Steiner and Ozaki); Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx1-Red, Judgment on 
the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute,” at 80 (June 8, 2018) (noting the Dissenting Opinion of Judges Monageng 
and Hofmanski, Separate Opinion of Judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison, and Separate and 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji). 
185. See Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 140, at 264 (“In the first eighteen years of WTO dispute 
settlement, fewer than 8 percent of the panel reports, and fewer than 5 percent of AB reports, contained 
dissents or separate opinions.”). 
186. Appellate Body Report, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Rule 4, WTO Doc. 
WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
187. Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, The WTO Appellate Body’s Decision-Making Process: A Perfect Model for 
International Adjudication?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 289, 302-04 (2009); see also Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The 
Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895, 908 (2006) (arguing that this level of 
collegiality can partly be attributed to the fact that, unlike in the ICJ, members do not represent any 
particular geographical region or “seat”).  
188. Alvarez-Jimenez, supra note 187, at 309-10. 
189. Alvarez-Jimenez, supra note 187, at 317-20; see also Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1149 (2015) (suggesting that at the panel level, panel chairs who have been 
accultured into the WTO system over time and favor consensus building have a major influence on 
the outcomes, hence discouraging formal dissents); Lewis, supra note 187, at 915 (arguing that the AB’s 
non-discretionary case-load coupled with a high volume of cases discourages dissent). 
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document.190 While putatively anonymous, the identity of the opinion writer 
is usually either known or heavily speculated upon by insiders and states.191 
2. Other forms of judicial speech 
 Individual written opinions are not the only form of international judi-
cial speech that have risen in prominence. Indeed, judges in different arenas 
of international adjudication have become more visible actors, with their 
pronouncements –– both inside and outside the courtroom –– being subject 
to greater scrutiny and comment.  
 One of the most controversial fallouts of this hypervisibility has been 
the ostensible policing of oral questioning from the bench during proceed-
ings. This was brought into focus by the refusal of the U.S. in 2016 to en-
dorse the reappointment of a WTO AB Member, Seung Wha Chang, on the 
basis that he had exceeded his authority in deciding issues not necessary for 
the resolution of the dispute. Although there was nothing to suggest that 
the “activist” parts of the reports—signed collectively by all AB members—
should be attributed to Mr. Chang, the U.S. pointed to questions he posed 
during hearings as evidence of authorship.192 Apart from the dubiousness 
of this evidentiary standard, the incident gave rise to concerns that Members 
will now face incentives to be strategic in their conduct during proceedings, 
with an eye to how their behavior will be perceived by states and other con-
stituencies.193   
 Judges and arbitrators have taken to various academic outlets to air their 
views on a range of legal issues. This trend seems to be especially pro-
nounced in areas of international law where there is a close connection be-
tween one’s academic credentials and prospects for appointment to an in-
ternational tribunal. In the world of investment arbitration, a significant 
number of elite arbitrators cycle between academia and stints as arbitrators 
in specific disputes, but even those in private practice are prolific authors in 
trade and research outlets.194 Indeed, arbitrators writing and speaking in 
                                               
190. Flett, supra note 161, at 303-04. 
191. Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 140, at 267-68 (giving examples of ostensible state retaliation 
against Members who were suspected of having voted against state interests in the form of failure to 
nominate/re-nominate the Member). As they show, not only may states believe that they can identify 
who issued the separate opinion, but also that the failure to issue a dissent in a system where dissent is 
permissible may be taken as a Member’s acquiescence in the reasoning and result reached by the AB). 
Id.; see also Flett, supra note 161, at 306-07 (remarking that the identity of the separate opinion writer 
“may be a matter of common knowledge” in WTO litigation circles). 
192. United States Blocks Reappointment of WTO Appellate Body Member, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 573, 574, 
578 (2016). 
193. Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 140, at 270-71. 
194. For the career profiles and publication records of such arbitrators, like Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, Brigitte Stern, Charles Brower, Albert Jan Van Den Berg, and Karl Heinz Bockstiegel, see, e.g., 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, LÉVY KAUFMANN-KOHLER, https://lk-k.com/team/gabrielle-kaufmann-
 
2020] SEPARATE JUDICIAL SPEECH 33 
 
academic fora have driven much of the debate on the value of separate opin-
ions in investment arbitration.195   
 The same is true of judges of the ICJ and the ECtHR, where there is a 
strong tradition of judges authoring scholarly works and making frequent 
appearances on the conference circuit. ECtHR judges have also been re-
markably candid in public about their views on separate opinions, holding 
interviews, writing, and speaking on the topic, both in the context of the 
ECtHR’s institutional posture and their personal stance on the practice.196  
 Academic fora might in fact be one of the few “respectable” avenues 
for voicing individual opinions open to judges in courts like the CJEU, 
where the legal framework precludes separate speech on the bench. The 
CJEU requires judges to obtain prior authorization from the Court for ex-
ternal activities, including teaching, participation in conferences, and other 
activities of an academic nature.197 However, the process does not appear to 
constitute a serious barrier to CJEU judges exercising their freedom to 
weigh in on institutional issues in academic fora, including on the desirability 
of reforms to introduce separate opinions at the court.198  
C. The Value of Separate International Judicial Speech  
Given that international judiciaries drew from domestic models, it is not 
surprising that arguments in support of (or against) international separate 
speech are parallel to those made domestically. First, separate opinions are 
                                               
kohler-lawyer/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020); Prof. Brigitte Stern, GENEVA CTR. FOR INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT, https://www.cids.ch/mids/the-program/the-faculty/494-brigitte-stern (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2020); The Honorable Charles N Brower, TWENTY ESSEX, https://twentyessex.com/ 
people/charles-brower/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020); Albert Jan van den Berg, HANOTIAU & VAN DEN 
BERG, http://www.hvdb.com/albert-jan-van-den-berg/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020); Prof. Dr. Karl-
Heinz Bockstiegel, INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., https://tinyurl.com/y3teqega (last visited Sept. 10, 
2020). 
195. See, e.g., van den Berg, supra note 179, at 825-36 (arguing against dissenting opinions on the 
ground that they mostly demonstrate bias on the part of party-appointed arbitrators). But cf. Brower & 
Rosenberg, supra note 180, at 7 (challenging the data in van den Berg’s thesis and arguing that dissenting 
opinions contribute to the legitimacy of international arbitration). 
196. See, e.g., Fred J. Bruinsma & Stephan Parmentier, Interview with Mr. Luzius Wildhaber, President 
of the ECHR, 21 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 185, 187 (2003) (where Judge Wildhaber not only speaks about 
activism versus judicial restraint as factors influencing the propensity to issue separate opinions, but 
also discusses his personal views on a range of provisions in the ECtHR); see also White & Boussiakou, 
supra note 175, at 57-58 (interviewing ECtHR judges to conclude that the majority are overwhelmingly 
in favor of separate opinions at the court). 
197. Code of Conduct, art. 5, 2007 O.J. (C 223) 1-2; see Christoph Krenn, Self-Government at the 
Court of Justice of the European Union: A Bedrock for Institutional Success, 19 GERMAN L.J. 2007, 2024-25 
(2018) (noting that a similar rule applies to other members of the CJEU, including law clerks).  
198. See, e.g., Azizi, supra note 164 (arguing against the introduction of separate opinions at the 
CJEU). See generally Harm Schepel & Rein Wesseling, The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and 
Clerks in the Writing of Europe, 3 EUR. L.J. 165, 178-80 (1997) (for a sampling of the kinds of legal issues 
addressed by CJEU judges in their academic writing).  
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lauded as contributing to the quality of the majority judgment199 and the 
overall architecture of international law.200 International separate opin-
ions—perhaps more so than their domestic brethren—play a critical correc-
tive role for law making, especially in nascent areas of international law,201 or 
in identifying and aiding gap-filling in treaty instruments,202 due to the ab-
sence of formal precedent internationally. 
 Second, as is the case domestically, separate opinions play a symbolic 
role in assuring the losing party that the court gave its position and argu-
ments full consideration. Even more critically at the international level, such 
recognition may directly shape stakeholder confidence in the court. Consid-
erable evidence demonstrates that such confidence is essential for continued 
reliance on the institution as well as compliance with its judgments.203  
 Third, separate opinions contribute to norms of transparency and ac-
countability in the judicial decision-making process.204 Some argue that in-
dividual opinions help to ensure diversity in approaches for courts such as 
the ICJ that seek to represent the “main forms of civilisation and principal 
                                               
199. See Lewis, supra note 187, at 905 (arguing that forcing a false consensus in decision-making 
will result in poor WTO jurisprudence in the long term). 
200. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 66 (1958) (arguing that individual opinions “greatly facilitate the fulfilment 
of the indirect purpose of the Court, which is to develop and clarify international law.”); Breeze, supra 
note 154, at 407 (noting that notwithstanding the lack of a doctrine of stare decisis in investment 
arbitration, ICSID decisions frequently cite other ICSID decisions as well as awards rendered by other 
arbitral tribunals); Lewis, supra note 187, at 902 (“Although as a technical matter stare decisis does not 
apply in the WTO context, as a practical one, panels and the Appellate Body do appear to rely heavily 
on the logic in past reports.”). 
201. Titi, supra note 154, at 203-05 (arguing that the ad hoc nature of investment arbitration means 
that one tribunal’s minority opinion can become another’s majority opinion and citing multiple means 
by which dissents contribute to the development of the law in investment arbitration); cf. van den Berg, 
supra note 179, at 831 (“[A] party-appointed arbitrator does not have the expectation that his or her 
dissent will contribute to the development of investment law because . . . dissents are virtually never 
relied upon in subsequent investment cases.”). 
202. Lewis, supra note 187, at 927, 930 (suggesting that dissenting opinions may spur WTO 
Members to negotiate amendments to WTO Agreements); cf. Flett, supra note 161, at 314 (arguing 
generally against dissents at the WTO on the basis that it is equally possible for alternative viewpoints 
to be aired by the litigants rather than by panel or AB members).  
203. Anand, supra note 137, at 794 (alluding to the political and psychological importance of 
individual opinions for the losing party).  
204. Adam M. Smith, “Judicial Nationalism” in International Law: National Identity and Judicial Autonomy 
at the ICJ, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 197, 226 (2005) (claiming that dissents secure individual judicial 
accountability as well as institutional integrity); see also Mistry, supra note 171, at 310 (arguing that 
separate opinions “serve as a potential check on the use or abuse of judicial authority by other political 
actors.”); Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, A Defense of Dissents in Investment Arbitration, 
43 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 445, 470 (2012) (emphasizing the “necessary connection between the 
tenets of transparency, reason, and objectivity, and the jurisprudence of dissents.”); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, 
Dissent as Dialectic: Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO Dispute Settlement, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 
11 (2012) (describing WTO adjudication “as a type of dialectical process, whereby ‘opinions 
communicate to audiences beyond the immediate parties to the dispute.’”). 
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legal systems of the world.”205 This relationship between individual opinions 
and adherence to democratic values and principles by international courts 
has been especially prominent in proposals for reform at tribunals that cur-
rently prohibit or discourage separate opinions, for example the WTO and 
the CJEU.206  
 As is the case domestically, separate international opinions also have 
their detractors. Critics worry that individual judicial voices muddy the cen-
tral message of the court and erode the authority and legitimacy that a unan-
imous judgement commands. This danger is pronounced in the case of new 
tribunals that are still in the process of building a reputation and goodwill.207 
Some scholars suggest that separate opinions are counterproductive at a 
court such as the ICC. Differences in judicial opinion on the guilt or inno-
cence of an individual, especially a high-level accused alleged to have com-
mitted horrific crimes, can erode credibility in the judgment and weaken its 
law-guidance function.208 In addition, parties and states express concern 
about the utility of dissents that are acrimonious in tone and do not seem to 
add anything of substance to the reasoning of the court.209  
 Notwithstanding these critical voices, the law and practice of interna-
tional tribunals evince a clear trend in favor of separate judicial speech, both 
on and off the bench.  
IV. A TYPOLOGY OF JUDICIAL SPEECH 
This Part offers a typology of separate judicial speech. Its purpose is not 
to exhaustively catalogue every possible instance of such speech. Rather, 
                                               
205. See Anand, supra note137, at 801; Mistry, supra note 171, at 310 (arguing that individual 
opinions, by the very fact of their existence, are expressive of the diversity of ICJ judges). In addition, 
individual opinions open up the possibility for different legal traditions to be voiced and given effect 
to in the adjudicatory process. Id.; see also Bruinsma & Blots, supra note 176, at 185-86 (suggesting that 
individual opinions at the ECtHR enable the different national traditions of the Member States to feel 
at home in the common European project); cf. Flett, supra note 161, at 317 (contrasting this vision of 
international courts with that of the raison d’etre and composition of the WTO panel and AB 
Members, which eschew this geographical link). 
206. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 187, at 923 (arguing that lack of dissents is representative of broader 
complaints about the lack of transparency in the WTO dispute settlement process); Turenne, supra note 
163, at 743 (“[I]t would be desirable to have separate opinions, as they permit the tensions and conflicts 
of the social order to be played out in the jurisdictional structure of the European system.”); Solanke, 
supra note 163, at 708 (“[A] corporate court is no longer appropriate for the post-Lisbon democracy in 
the EU.”). 
207. See, e.g., James Bacchus, Lone Star: The Historic Role of the WTO, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 401, 409 
(2004) (arguing that the lack of dissent in the initial years of the WTO system was a deliberate move to 
build respect for its decisions); Lewis, supra note 204, at 10 (conceding that a persistent failure to achieve 
consensus could have destabilizing effects given the WTO’s relative youth).  
208. See, e.g., Leila N. Sadat, Fiddling While Rome Burns? The Appeals Chamber’s Curious Decision in 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba-Gombo, EUR. J. INT’L L. BLOG: EJIL: TALK! (June 12, 2018), https:// 
tinyurl.com/y65se2j6. 
209. Anand, supra note 137, at 789 (referring to the “general decline in courtesy and good 
manners” as manifested in some dissenting opinions at the ICJ). 
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combining the analysis of the laws and practice of speaking separately in 
Parts I and II with insights from political science, sociology, law, and lan-
guage, this Part suggests that separate judicial speech falls along five dimen-
sions of variance. These dimensions represent layered continuums upon 
which we might place the most salient forms of judicial speech, and reflect 
different approaches to the role and function of judges in the creation, de-
velopment, application, and reception of international and domestic law.   
A. Formal-Informal  
The prototypical separate speech is the dissent—mostly written, but oc-
casionally oral—or less commonly, the concurrence. These, however, rep-
resent only a small fraction of the numerous ways in which judges make 
their individual voices heard. Judicial speech occurs in multiple fora outside 
of the courtroom, straddling the divide between formality and informality. 
‘Formal’ refers to judicial speech that is part of courtroom proceedings, such 
as a written dissenting opinion; ‘semi-formal’ to speech that is extrajudicial 
in character but which may nonetheless be considered an extension of the 
judicial role, for example an academic article; and ‘informal’ to statements 
made in the public sphere without any explicit reference to the speaker’s 
judicial identity.  
Scholarship on domestic and international courts focuses primarily on 
the first category, and largely on dissenting opinions. Other forms of speech 
that a judge might employ during courtroom proceedings have been largely 
ignored. After separate written opinions, oral dissents are perhaps the most 
commented upon type of formal judicial speech. As discussed in Part I, oral 
dissents have a long history in the U.S. context, and are often characterized 
as a more profound act of disagreement and a way of speaking to a wider 
constituency of political actors.210  
There is virtually no scholarly analysis of oral dissents in international 
tribunals. Judge Sow’s “dissent” in the Charles Taylor trial attracted some 
attention, only to be dismissed as a public statement rather than a bona fide 
oral dissent.211 What seems clear is that choosing to speak from the bench 
in oral form has a different resonance from doing so in writing. Through its 
nearly simultaneous delivery with the majority judgment, the oral opinion 
conveys and embodies immediacy, especially in a world of live media up-
dates and the Twitterverse. When delivered in charged circumstances such 
                                               
210. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
211. See Charles Jalloh, The Verdict in the Charles Taylor Case and the Alternate Judge’s “Dissenting 
Opinion,” EUR. J. INT’L L. BLOG: EJIL: TALK! (May 11, 2012), https://tinyurl.com/y4nh8ts3 (arguing 
that Alternate Judge Sow’s views in the Charles Taylor case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone were 
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as the Taylor trial, an oral dissent not only demands but commands public and 
media attention in a way that a written legal text can rarely imitate. 
Beyond the oral dissent, judges formally speak from the bench in the 
form of questions or statements during the course of a hearing. Some stud-
ies consider the strategic reasons behind oral questioning by U.S. Supreme 
Court justices or its use as a substitute for judicial deliberation,212 but little 
attention has been devoted to the practice at other levels of the judiciary or 
its use in other tribunals. International tribunals differ significantly in the 
extent to which oral questioning is commonplace and expected. Different 
chambers within the same tribunal may also follow a range of practices, de-
pending on the composition of a specific bench. For instance, some but not 
all of the ICC chambers follow an informal convention whereby other 
judges channel questions through the Presiding Judge, permitting little space 
for identifiable separate speech. An outlier among international criminal tri-
bunals, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
follows the civil law model, with judges largely displacing the parties’ lawyers 
and assuming primary responsibility for questioning witnesses.213 
Interpreting judicial questioning can be complicated. For instance, judi-
cial questioning during the hearing might be motivated by seeking to better 
understand an argument, or as a way to play devil’s advocate to test a party’s 
arguments and assumptions. Neither of these aspects are true of separate 
written or oral opinions. Interpreting judicial speech gets even trickier once 
we move outside the courtroom to semi-formal situations in which judges 
deliver public lectures, participate in symposia, and publish academic arti-
cles. In doing so, they typically signal that anything they say or write is not 
in their judicial capacity. Nonetheless, it is difficult to fully isolate formal 
judicial utterances from the speech of individual judges in other public fora. 
Nor is it entirely clear that the audience is meant to do so. A prime example 
of this elision are the frequent statements on a range of legal issues by CJEU 
judges—barred from voicing their individual positions within the court-
room—in academic outlets, presumably with a view to at least partially in-
fluencing the political debate on reform of the CJEU.214 
Another instance of controversial semi-formal speech occurred when 
AB Member Thomas Graham purportedly threatened to resign unless the 
WTO adopted reforms to address U.S. criticisms, and subsequently unless 
                                               
212. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
213. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 703 (Göran Sluiter et 
al. eds., 2013). 
214. See generally Mitchel Lasser, European Judicial Appointments Reform: A Neo-Institutionalist 
Approach, in JUDICIAL POWER: HOW CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AFFECT POLITICAL 
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member governments removed the Director of the AB Secretariat, Werner 
Zdouc.215 Two AB Members (although not Graham himself) and one for-
mer Member responded in an open letter to counter these “misrepresenta-
tions” about the AB’s position on Zdouc.216  
Codes of ethics and rules governing conflicts of interest typically cabin 
the ability of a judge to speak in these fora. While the U.S. government 
largely enforces these at the domestic level, it is rare to see any formal sanc-
tions for their violation by international judges. Indeed, as with U.S. Su-
preme Court justices, judicial candor and the willingness to ‘call things out’ 
might make the judge a much sought-after invitee in non-courtroom set-
tings, especially for judges who have close links with academia. These semi-
formal ways of engaging with legal and political communities could signifi-
cantly shape the interpretation and reception of a formal judicial opinion, 
and may have broader institutional ramifications, a point to which the next 
Part returns. 
Finally, informal judicial speech may take the form of statements by 
judges that are ostensibly divorced from the judicial role but are nonetheless 
intended for public consumption. This mode of speaking separately is more 
common in legal systems like that of the U.S. where judges, particularly 
those appointed to the Supreme Court, have significant public profiles.217 
Supreme Court justices have been remarkably willing to embrace blurring 
the boundary between their judicial and non-judicial lives at different points 
in history, including through authorizing biographies, writing memoirs, and 
authoring works of fiction and non-fiction, becoming household names in 
the process. The latest example is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s ascendance 
as a pop culture icon, who transcends both the generational divide and low 
and high-brow culture, inspiring biopics, opera, a Saturday Night Live char-
acter, action figures, tattoos, t-shirts and even memes with the phrase “I 
dissent.”218 A similar trend seems to be taking hold in the United Kingdom, 
with the public labeling the President of the Supreme Court, Lady Hale, as 
the “Beyoncé” of the legal profession.219 
No international judge has acquired a public profile to this extent, but 
examples abound of cults of celebrity in specific areas of international law, 
both inspiring and inspired by informal judicial speech. Examples include 
the recent Netflix historical drama miniseries that offers a revisionist history 
                                               
215. Steve Charnovitz, Comments on the Appellator Graham Affair, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG 
(Dec. 2, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y4c6lafc.  
216. Hannah Monicken, WTO Appellate Body Members Condemn ‘Misrepresentations’ in Media, WORLD 
TRADE ONLINE (Dec. 3, 2019, 2:04 PM).  
217. See generally DAVIS, supra note 41.  
218. Stephanie Francis Ward, Supreme Icon, 104 A.B.A. J. 34 (2018). 
219. Caroline Binham, Brenda Hale, a Judge with the Human Touch, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/826cefc0-db8a-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17. 
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of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE) through the 
eyes of its main protagonist, dissenting justice Radhabinod Pal.220 Recent 
memoirs also fall into this category, such as those of Carl Baudenbacher, 
former judge and President of the Court of Justice of the European Free 
Trade Association States, and former Judges Weeramantry and Buergenthal 
of the ICJ.221 Can commentators isolate the philosophical, political, and nor-
mative positions contained in these reflections from efforts to predict or 
construe a judge’s legal opinion? Does such informal speech possess inde-
pendent legal salience given that the judge’s voice is solicited and amplified 
by virtue of their former or current role as a judge? 
B. Visible-Obscured 
Must a judge voice an opinion publicly and prominently in order for it 
to count as separate judicial speech? While there are numerous examples of 
judges with a penchant for issuing distinctive and extremely visible separate 
opinions, this propensity is invariably mediated by the procedures and con-
ventions of the specific court or tribunal.  
An individual opinion does not, however, need to be prominently la-
belled and displayed as such. In the United States, prior to the introduction 
of a syllabus appended to each opinion under the Burger Court, it was dif-
ficult to discern the composition of voting coalitions; in addition, when jus-
tices merely noted disagreements without an opinion, these were buried 
deep within Supreme Court rulings.222 The civil-law-influenced ECCC has 
at least one instance of a dissenting opinion embedded within a judge-
ment—the few paragraphs contained within the Trial Chamber’s judgment 
in the Duch case.223 Similarly, separate opinions in the WTO—whether con-
curring or dissenting—are anonymously embedded in the dispute reports, 
or in some cases included within footnotes.224 Even less visible are instances 
                                               
220. Tokyo Trial, NETFLIX (2017), https://www.netflix.com/title/80091880. 
221. CARL BAUDENBACHER, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: MEMOIRS OF A EUROPEAN JUDGE 
(2019) (containing a blurb for the book that describes it as “[r]ichly seasoned with personal memories 
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decision. Prosecutor v. Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶¶ 397-99 
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, July 26, 2010). 
224. Flett, supra note 161, at 303-04. 
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when a judge expresses disagreement internally over procedure, reasoning, 
or outcome, with no written or public trace of its expression. 
On the far end of the spectrum, there are cases where a judge would be 
inclined to issue an individual opinion but instead silently acquiesces in the 
majority judgment, as in the case with the U.S. domestic practice of issuing 
“graveyard dissents.”225 Judges might also circulate and exchange memo-
randa, letters, notes, and emails that may never see the light of day unless 
they are revealed through the publication of official archives.226 At the in-
ternational level, some indications of a similar practice might be found in 
the procedure for producing written opinions at various tribunals. For in-
stance, the ICJ requires each individual judge to formulate and circulate a 
tentative written opinion as the basis for internal judicial deliberation. Thus, 
there is at least a possibility that some of these individual opinions are even-
tually buried, for the sake of unanimity, in a high-stakes dispute.227 Similarly, 
due to the single judgment requirement at the CJEU, “whatever cannot be 
agreed to is simply excised from the judgment,” rendering it largely invisible 
to those outside the court.228 
A number of personal and institutional considerations may influence 
the decision to refrain from visibly nailing one’s colors to the mast, including 
the desire to avoid incurring the wrath of those who appointed you, career 
ambitions, preserving an outwardly united judicial front, and surrendering 
to the majority on an issue one does not care too much about in order to 
increase one’s bargaining power on future issues that are more important.229 
The choice to do so, however, will impact the reach of the reasons that 
animated the separate opinion, since it may be partially or completely ob-
scured from public knowledge and scrutiny. 
Off the bench, separate speech is highly visible when judges give public 
talks, publish op-eds, or give interviews. Both international and domestic 
judges frequently engage in these activities, typically on the subject of the 
institution in which they serve(d). Academic publications acquire some de-
gree of visibility as well, and quite a few judges publish on legal subjects both 
                                               
225. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
226. See Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1669 (2013) (noting 
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228. Sally J. Kenney, Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as Organizations by Comparing Réfé-
rendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court, 33 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 
593, 598 (2000). 
229. For a sophisticated analysis of the factors influencing judicial transparency in international 
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domestically and internationally.230 This practice is perhaps more common 
at the international level, as many judges hail from academia and often con-
tinue in their positions after being elected or return to them after serving 
their terms.  
Judges also engage in practices that bury, at least temporarily, their off-
the-bench remarks. For instance, judges maintain private papers, diaries, and 
notes on a range of legal and non-legal issues, including but not limited to 
their judicial career. These may never be published, be made available selec-
tively upon their death, or be embargoed in other ways till some specified 
future date or event.231  
C. Individual-Collective 
Collegiality on multi-member courts is typically lauded. Indeed, critiques 
of separate opinion writing point to the costs of separate opinions on inter-
personal and working relationships.232 On any multi-member court, one can 
expect judges to value collegiality given that an individual has little to no 
authority alone; substantive judgments require agreement amongst at least a 
majority of judges.233 In the U.S. context, some judges even point to colle-
giality considerations when explaining why they sometimes silently acqui-
esce.234 Collegiality dictates that judges should work “closely together with 
‘respect for the strengths of the others,’ with restraint on ‘one’s pride of 
authorship’ . . . in the pursuit of ‘excellence in the court’s decision.’”235 In 
this view, the romanticized ‘lone dissenter’236 or the proliferation of strident 
separate opinions represents a threat to collegiality.237 Yet even in the formal 
                                               
230. For instance, many CJEU judges have published extensively on European Union law. See, 
e.g., G. F. MANCINI, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: COL-
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231. See Watts, supra note 226, at 1674-75.  
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233. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 115, at 1017 (making this point with respect to the U.S. courts 
of appeals). 
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257, 258 (2008) (quoting COFFIN, supra note 232, at 215).  
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alone difficult for judges. See Donald Granberg & Brandon Bartels, On Being a Lone Dissenter, 35 J. 
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237. COFFIN, supra note 232, at 224. 
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judicial context, separate speech is not always individualistic and may even 
exhibit or contribute to collegiality on the court.  
At times, a judge speaks separately as a member of a collective, such as 
when issuing a jointly penned separate opinion. Despite the prevalence of 
joint separate opinions domestically and internationally, we know very little 
about the reasons why a judge chooses to join an opinion penned by a col-
league or—in a distinct act of group-think-and-write—jointly pen a separate 
opinion. When one examines joining behavior itself, it is typically in the 
context of the decision to join a majority or plurality opinion. 
What might explain why a judge would choose to collectively speak sep-
arately? The prevalence of this practice likely increases as the number of 
judges on a given bench increases, and decreases as their diversity does. With 
more colleagues on the bench, there is a greater likelihood that a judge will 
agree with at least one of them—or can find an acceptable compromise—
such that penning together or joining makes sense for both efficiency rea-
sons and the strength of speaking together. Conversely, if ideological or 
other forms of diversity on the bench are extreme, the probability of finding 
a like-minded co-author is smaller. These two factors alone, however, pro-
vide an insufficient account of why and when this practice emerges.  
For example, while the fifteen ideologically and culturally diverse ICJ 
judges frequently append separate opinions, they do so as individuals as of-
ten as they do collectively, with the practice of joint separate opinions pre-
sent since the court’s inception.238 In contrast, despite the relatively large 
size of the WTO’s Appellate Body, seven members hailing from diverse cul-
tures and legal systems, it has adhered to a position of strict collegiality. This 
has led to intense bargaining and deliberation internally, but a near perfect 
record of unanimous—or by consensus—decisions.239 The large size and 
toward individualized views 
Workload constraints, legal culture, or professional incentives may 
shape the practice of joint separate opinions. In the context of the ECtHR, 
joint separate opinions are ubiquitous, which may be due to the fact that 
separate opinion writers receive no drafting support from the Court’s Reg-
istry.240 Most cases that pass the admissibility stage are ultimately decided by 
seven-judge Chambers, where separate opinions are less frequent and tend 
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toward individualized views.241 The plethora of joint separate opinions, 
however, is readily apparent for Grand Chamber judgments, which are re-
served for cases that raise serious interpretation problems and are decided 
in a chamber of seventeen judges.  
Judges also speak separately together with their clerks when they rely on 
them to conduct legal research and draft opinions, a widespread practice 
both domestically and internationally.242 Despite the ubiquity of reliance on 
clerks or judicial assistants, there is comparatively little written about their 
role in foreign courts243 and even less for international ones.244 American 
judges frequently describe these relationships as collaborative, with clerks as 
“partners,” “alter-egos,” or a “team of horses in a harness,”245 and the rela-
tionship as “the most intense and mutually dependent one . . . outside of 
marriage, parenthood, or a love affair.”246  
At the international level, a judge’s dependency on the equivalent of a 
clerk may reduce the proclivity to pen separate opinions. In the WTO, for 
example, Secretariat officials (who assist panelist adjudicators) perform 
much of the legal research and writing of panel reports, which may help 
explain the low number of dissents.247 In the CJEU, référendaires perform 
many of the same tasks as domestic clerks, including drafting opinions and 
orders when their judge is rapporteur. These drafts ultimately result in a single 
judgment—thus not technically separate speech—but the drafting process 
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itself does represent an instance of the judge rapporteur ‘speaking together’ 
with her référendaire.248 
Both domestic and international judges further rely on clerks to assist in 
preparation for oral argument and to suggest questions for the judge to pose 
to parties.249 For instance, WTO panelists sometimes ask questions clearly 
prepared for them by the Secretariat.250 In a number of international courts, 
one or more judicial assistants attend hearings or oral arguments, sometimes 
passing notes and communicating about arguments being made. Such prac-
tices raise a host of challenging conceptual and normative questions: when 
judges pose questions prepared by their judicial assistant(s), should we con-
sider this an act of individual or collective separate speech? Who bears re-
sponsibility for what is said, or put differently, who is speaking?   
D. Present-Future Oriented 
Judicial speech has a temporal orientation, often linked to the motiva-
tion behind speaking separately. If the intent is to persuade colleagues or 
influence the thinking of litigants, a judge will orient her remarks to the pre-
sent context and audience.251 At other times, she is oriented to the proximate 
or even distant future, with the intent to influence the thinking of legisla-
tures, future litigants, other courts, future judicial majorities, or the next gen-
eration of law students, in the hopes of shaping policy or jurisprudence. 
These signals—attempts at persuasion about appropriate policies or legal 
principles—to the public and the future, often at quite a distance, outline an 
alternative vision.  
This is particularly true for dissents, which Justice Brennan character-
ized as “appeal[s] to the future.”252 Concurrences may be oriented more to 
the immediate future, in terms of encouraging lawyers and litigants to focus 
their efforts in a specific direction, or to make a “record for the future,”253 
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or in Justice Frankfurter’s words, “record prophecy and shape history.”254  
All acts of speaking separately are further oriented to the proximate future 
when they seek to spark deliberation or provide impetus for activists and 
broader social movements to push back against majority opinions that are 
“inconsistent with the values of the community they represent.”255  
Other ways of speaking separately—such as academic articles or policy 
memos on court operations—similarly orient the performative force of sep-
arate judicial speech to future developments. A striking example is how 
heavily involved previous and sitting judges of the ECtHR have been in 
debates surrounding reform of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. A number of judges have written policy papers, articles, and given 
speeches that weigh in on the reform debates from Protocol 11 to Interlaken 
and beyond.256  
It is worth noting, however, that there will be occasions where there is 
a disjunction between the intended temporal orientation of the separate 
speech and its actual impact, if and when it materializes. While judges may 
intentionally choose to focus on specific types of content—legal or extra-
legal—or adopt a particular style or form of speech—colloquial or technical 
—with a certain audience in mind, they will have precious little control over 
how and when this speech gets taken up by various audiences. Present-ori-
ented individual speech may take months or even years to percolate into 
wider public consciousness and debate, though a judge might try to influ-
ence the pace and reach of its dissemination by generating the appropriate 
publicity.257 This might in turn raise concerns about judicial propriety and 
the limits of direct judicial engagement with external stakeholders. Part IV 
returns to these considerations. 
E. Monologic-Dialogic 
Not all instances of speaking separately are acts of defiance or rebellion. 
Indeed, appending a separate opinion, or even a dissent, may be motivated 
by a desire to bolster the reasoning or conclusion reflected in a majority 
judgment. Dissents and concurrences could also serve as a medium for en-
gaging one’s fellow judges in a visible dialogue on the substance of the legal 
dispute. Separate opinions can thus be more or less monologic or dialogic, 
based on whether the speech is directed towards and in conversation with 
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the other members of the bench, or if it is primarily individualistic and op-
positional in character.  
Dialogic separate opinions include a wide range of voices, in terms of 
style and content; what is common to this category is that although the judge 
chooses to speak individually, she refrains from questioning the bona fides 
or the legitimacy of the judicial body, of the fellow members of the court, 
or of the majority opinion. Dialogic concurrences, dissents, and declarations 
may be terse and legalistic on the one hand, or eloquently poetic on the 
other. In every case, the judge seeks to add her voice, in the form of a set of 
reasons or in the fashioning of the ultimate verdict, to the voice of the court. 
A dialogic separate opinion will engage with the reasoning and conclusions 
of the majority while charting a different course for assessing the legal dis-
pute at issue. Whether assertive or deferential, the dialogic opinion is typi-
cally respectful of the authority of the legal process and of the institution of 
which it is a part. Its reasoning will be directed towards the fellow members 
of the court, as well as to other stakeholders in the legal process with a view 
to encouraging legal debate, development, and change in a constructive 
spirit. 
In contrast, monologic separate opinions are not addressed only—or 
even primarily—to fellow judges. The monologic separate opinion typically 
avoids a point-by-point rebuttal of the legal or factual analysis set out in the 
majority judgment; instead, it seeks to construct its own version of the dis-
pute and refutes the majority’s argumentation within the structure of the 
separate opinion’s discourse. In this sense, it aspires to equal the stance of 
the majority opinion: it appropriates alternative voices and allows differ-
ences to be aired, but only to the extent they can be addressed and answered 
within the controlling narrative of the individual opinion.258 
The monologic opinion may be forcefully individualistic in its tone. To 
the extent that remarks are addressed to other members of the court, they 
do not exhibit the hope or expectation of a continued dialogue and at times 
veer towards the other extreme of reproachful or even accusatory. In some 
cases, the refusal to engage comes at a serious cost to civility and to institu-
tional legitimacy.  
This danger is evident in monologic opinions both on and off the bench. 
A good example of the former is Judge Flavia Lattanzi’s “partially dissenting 
opinion” in the Šešelj case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugo-
slavia. From the very outset, she makes no effort to conceal her contempt 
for the majority judgment, claiming that the qualifier “partial” to her dissent 
is but a euphemism, given that her disagreement could hardly be more 
                                               
258. Id. at 1171-72. 
 
2020] SEPARATE JUDICIAL SPEECH 47 
 
complete on every aspect of the case.259 She upbraids the majority for blam-
ing the prosecution for poor case handling and consistently criticizes the 
judgment for its failure to apply correct law, properly evaluate the evidence, 
and supply clear—or indeed any—reasoning for its conclusions.260 Her clos-
ing statement could not be more damning: “[W]ith this Judgment we have 
been thrown back centuries into the past, to a period in human history when 
we used to say — and it was the Romans who used to say this to justify their 
bloody conquests and the assassinations of their political enemies during 
civil wars: Silent enim leges inter arma.”261 Judge Lattanzi doubled down on this 
official opinion with off-the-bench remarks on the judgment during an in-
terview, claiming the “ruling amounts to nothing” because “it is done so 
poorly, both in fact and law, that it is a nullity.”262 
A more recent and bizarre form of a monologic extra-judicial opinion is 
Australian Judge David Re’s litigation before the Appeals Chamber of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) (to which he had been appointed as 
Presiding Judge in Trial Chamber I). In a series of motions filed before the 
STL, he contested the appointment of judges to Trial Chamber II, sought 
to prevent the swearing-in of a fellow judge, and subsequently accused the 
President of the STL and a fellow judge on the Appeals Chamber of breach-
ing the fundamental rule of judicial impartiality.263 A judge—as opposed to 
a party to the dispute—filing a motion before the very court of which he is 
a member to disqualify another judge is unprecedented in both domestic 
and international law. 
This choice of argumentative style is consequential for the force with 
which it conveys the author’s values; in short, “words are politics.”264 When 
a judge elects to voice a monologic separate opinion, she explicitly or im-
plicitly challenges the institutional authority of the court, the legitimacy of 
the majority opinion, or both. In contrast to a dialogic opinion, which may 
be interpreted as an act of participating in a collective judicial enterprise, a 
monologic separate opinion constitutes a self-conscious denunciation of it.  
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V. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF JUDGES AND JUDICIARIES 
What is at stake in disaggregating separate judicial speech and identifying 
dimensions along which these acts vary? Understanding the reasons behind 
and effects of different ways of speaking separately is central to a compre-
hensive evaluation of the role that judges—as individuals—do and should 
play within society, domestic or international. Moreover, mapping what 
judges are actually doing—on and off the bench—improves our ability to 
weigh the tradeoffs embodied in particular design choices for judicial insti-
tutions and ethical rules. This section first identifies some of the stakes in 
recognizing and being attentive to the forms of separate judicial speech and 
the various ways in which speaking separately is consequential. It then out-
lines directions for future research in this area. 
A. The Consequences of Separate Judicial Speech 
When a judge speaks separately, she potentially speaks to multiple audi-
ences, both intended and unintended. The extent to which the different 
forms of judicial speech have ‘effects’ can vary from broad and significant, 
to less impactful but still wide-reaching consequences, to consequential for 
a limited audience only.  
A judge’s colleagues represent her most proximate audience. Speaking 
separately can be consequential for fellow judges on the bench, in that doing 
so may convince colleagues to adopt a different finding or line of reasoning. 
Even if this attempt at persuasion is unsuccessful, separate opinions can 
force the majority into a dialogue with the opinion,265 either in private—in 
the hope that the judge inclined to speak separately might limit their disa-
greement to a graveyard dissent or a dubitante opinion—or in public, with 
the expectation that the majority opinion will be the better for having 
demonstrated that it has considered the minority viewpoint. A failure to en-
gage with the individual opinion may have consequences for collegiality on 
the bench, though the type of the separate speech will mitigate such conse-
quences, with dialogic or collective separate opinions more likely to per-
suade and less likely to corrode collegiality. 
Parties to a case represent the next immediate audience. Speaking sepa-
rately—when visible and not obscured—may either vindicate the position 
of the losing party to some extent or provide alternative support for the 
winning party. Lines of questioning can also be consequential for parties, by 
signaling arguments that a judge may ultimately find persuasive, whether at 
the appellate stage or in future litigation. However, separate opinions may 
have negative consequences vis-à-vis the parties, particularly at the 
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international level. For example, many worry that for tribunals like the ICJ 
that deal with high stakes political disputes without any corresponding 
power to enforce their judgments, the increased cacophony produced by a 
band of “in-house official critics” will negatively impact the enforcement of 
judgments.266 Opposition to separate opinions seems particularly acute in 
areas of international economic law such as trade and arbitration.267 The fear 
is that even the option to dissent incentivizes the judge or arbitrator to go 
their own way rather than do the more difficult work of trying to achieve 
consensus. It also increases the risk that the judgment will be ignored or 
challenged.268 This risk is particularly high with monologic separate 
speech—whether formal or semi-formal—that challenges the institutional 
legitimacy of the tribunal. Likewise, collective separate speech might under-
mine the majority judgment more than separate speech by a single judge, 
especially if she is a habitual dissenter. 
The legal profession as a whole, including other courts and the legisla-
ture, constitutes the next proximate audience for separate judicial speech.269 
At their most consequential, visible separate opinions become future law.270 
This change can be mediated by courts through jurisprudential develop-
ments alone, but can also occur more immediately, if lawmakers and lobby-
ists rely on or draw inspiration from formal, semi-formal and extra-judicial 
statements to propose legislative changes in line with the separate view. Sep-
arate judicial speech may be consequential for lawyers thinking about future 
cases and potential litigation strategies, by suggesting ways in which litigants 
and lower courts can reframe case facts and legal arguments to garner 
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majority support;271 or by signaling that it might be more productive to seek 
relief in a different forum.272 
Separate opinions can also be consequential for the legal public by re-
straining the reach of the majority decision, weakening its persuasive author-
ity, or making it more vulnerable to reconsideration in the future. They may 
provide other courts with a justification for an alternative conclusion. Given 
the extent of judicial borrowing across international courts,273 separate opin-
ions, including off the bench statements by judges in private exchanges, 
closed door workshops, symposia, lectures, and academic outlets, may shape 
jurisprudential developments in other courts.   
Speaking separately together rather than individually presents a distinct 
set of issues for law-making and institutional design. If the same constella-
tion of judges regularly pens joint separate opinions, changes in a court’s 
composition may signal to litigants the possibility of winning over a majority 
in a subsequent case before a bench with a particular “coalition.” Joint sep-
arate opinions by judges at lower levels might be given more serious consid-
eration at the appellate level compared to lone voices, and may also be less 
easily prone to the charge that they undermine collegiality.  
When judges speak separately together with their clerks, this may have 
further jurisprudential consequences. Research on law clerk influence in the 
domestic context demonstrates they play a central role in the opinion-writ-
ing process, with consequences for the decision to pen a separate opinion,274 
stylistic choice, and variation across opinions.275 Stylistic decisions—such as 
word choice, phrasing, sentence and paragraph construction, and opinion 
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structure—are not trivial and may even have lasting effects on legal doc-
trine.276 
Speaking separately may also be consequential for more distant stake-
holders, constituencies, and the broader public. Visible separate judicial 
speech can “spark[] . . . deliberation” amongst the broader public,277 which 
may either contribute to or undermine the legitimacy and authority of the 
court in the eyes of various stakeholders.278 On one end of the spectrum, 
concurrences and even dialogic opinions are unlikely to pose much danger 
to the judgment or the court’s authority. On the other end, monologic opin-
ions and oral dissents could be used by judges to “signal their displeasure to 
the press, the American people, and the other branches of government”279 
and “to dramatize disagreements and tensions within the Court.”280 Further, 
semi-formal and informal forms of engagement with legal and political com-
munities and civil society may significantly shape the interpretation and re-
ception of a formal judicial opinion, and thus have broader ramifications.  
Finally, separate judicial speech can be directly consequential for a 
judge’s own career prospects. Oral questioning, for example, may be taken 
as evidence of a judge’s formal position on a legal or factual issue and have 
serious political repercussions, both for the individual judge, and for the 
dispute settlement mechanism as a whole. The controversy surrounding the 
U.S. decision to block the reappointment of the WTO Appellate Body 
member Seung Wha Chang illustrates this possibility. As Jeffrey Dunoff and 
Mark Pollack have shown recently, increasing the individual accountability 
of judges—by making visible the authors of separate opinions—can come 
at a cost to judicial independence if governments decide to punish such sep-
arate speech.281 Off the bench, speaking separately through academic publi-
cations, interviews, or public appearances can be similarly consequential for 
a judge’s professional trajectory.282  
It is worth noting that there will invariably be some instances of separate 
judicial speech that also have no discernible impact. Separate written opin-
ions are not always read, taken up by the legal community, or influence an-
yone’s thinking. Not all oral dissents receive media attention,283 limiting their 
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ability to have ramifications beyond satisfying a judge’s desire to be heard. 
Even if intended to signal alternative legal arguments, lines of questioning 
from the bench may be rejected by parties and one’s colleagues. Similarly, 
judges’ extrajudicial words may fall on deaf ears and leave no imprint on 
public discourse. 
However, given the range of potentially significant consequences of the 
different ways in which judges make their individual voices heard, separate 
judicial speech implicates the role that individual judges can and should play 
in both the development of the rule of law and the shaping of political con-
sciousness. Direct engagement with external stakeholders—whether judicial 
or extrajudicial—involves trade-offs.284 On the one hand, such external de-
liberation risks transforming legal questions into political struggles and raises 
further normative questions about expanding judges’ power and influence 
within society. The highly visible and semi-formal interventions by ECtHR 
judges in debates over reform of the court illustrate this tension and raises 
normative separation-of-powers issues, given that reform is legally in the 
hands of member governments of the Council of Europe.  
On the other hand, judges are public servants with the authority to in-
fluence the fates of individual citizens. As such, speaking in the public 
sphere and participating in broader discussions could be viewed as essential 
elements of democracy and accountability. Moreover, separate speech has 
potential ramifications for awareness of, knowledge about, identification 
with, and support for a court. This is one of the rationales for leading schol-
ars, member states, and even judges, calling for the introduction of separate 
opinions at courts like the CJEU.285 The argument is that with the enlarge-
ment of the EU in 2004, there is even greater need for transparency and 
democratic accountability at the CJEU, and that separate opinions have a 
role to play in this endeavor.286  
The type and form of separate speech also shapes the extent to which it 
personalizes individual judges. Oral questioning, for instance, might increase 
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familiarity with judges-as-persons for those in the courtroom and legal in-
siders, but does little to familiarize the broader public with an individual 
judge’s demeanor. When judges individually engage in highly visible semi-
formal or informal activities, however, they effectively strip away the ‘cloak 
of the judiciary’ or the ‘mask of the law,’ thereby humanizing themselves 
and, indirectly, the court. Doing so holds the potential to increase the degree 
to which a citizen or policymaker identifies with a judge, and to contribute 
to demystifying the court and the judicial process. In this way, visible semi-
formal and informal separate speech could increase legal access, especially 
for those who typically lack legal and political capital. This in turn has im-
plications for perceptions of and confidence in a court. 
While separate extrajudicial speech can demonstrate that judges are 
members of a larger community, judges nonetheless continue to be seen as 
symbols and representatives of the law and justice. The potential impact of 
their separate speech goes beyond public perceptions of an individual judge, 
and has implications for the integrity of the court. When a judge is defending 
the integrity of the judicial institution or engaging in public outreach and 
education, this might strengthen the judiciary and safeguard the integrity of 
judicial decision-making process, rather than undermine it. As is the case in 
the United States, greater public awareness of a court’s activities may in fact 
help build its institutional legitimacy.287 Particularly in an era of backlash 
against the judiciary—both domestically and internationally—external de-
liberation through separate judicial speech may be the last line of defense of 
the rule of law.  
B. Research Agenda  
This Article represents only the first step towards initiating a deeper and 
more fine-grained conversation between legal academics, political scientists, 
sociologists, and practitioners on the motives, frequency, and impact of dif-
ferent types of separate judicial speech. Much more work, both conceptual 
and empirical, needs to be done in order to address normative and policy-
related issues that are specific to the design and function of particular judicial 
institutions and their political context. Some lines of inquiry are internal and 
relate to the composition and functioning of courts, whereas others are ori-
ented towards their broader roles within society.  
One interesting set of questions revolves around the forms of separate 
judicial speech for which data and studies are available in the domestic U.S. 
context, but that have been virtually ignored at the international level. In 
contrast to the domestic context, for instance, there have been no attempts 
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to document at the international level oral dissents or questioning from the 
bench, much less analyze the reasons for these separate judicial practices 
and their impact.288 It would be instructive to map the incidence of these 
types of speech across international courts, and consider what accounts for 
their presence, absence, or fluctuation over time. Further research would 
then be warranted on how these forms of oral judicial speech interact with 
other institutional design features of international courts, and if they influ-
ence the fate of these courts or individual judges. 
Similarly, further research needs to be carried out to determine the fre-
quency and impact of ‘speaking separately together,’ both with fellow judges 
and with other members of the court, including clerks and staff of registries. 
What motivates judges to initiate or join coalitions, are certain factors such 
as national, political, or professional backgrounds predictive of their com-
position, and do they tend to be one-off or stable? Similar studies should be 
conducted to determine when and how clerk influence on international 
courts can be thought of as inappropriate. Should we adopt different ethical 
standards for judicial clerks than for, say, legislative staffers, executive aides, 
or other international civil servants?289 Is there evidence to suggest that the 
influence of judicial clerks on rulings supersedes that of the judges?290 
Moving beyond the architecture and practice of each individual court, it 
would be important to identify and study the horizontal or lateral conse-
quences––domestically and internationally––of different types of separate 
opinions in international courts. What kinds of separate opinions tend to be 
referenced or cited by either litigants or judges in domestic courts or other 
international courts? And what purpose does this citation serve? Do all 
forms of separate judicial speech––including off the bench commentary, 
publications, and judicial exchanges––have the same resonance in terms of 
transnational or global judicial dialogue? Does the existence of separate ju-
dicial speech impact the domestic enforcement of an international judgment 
or award, and if it does, is that due to its legal reception or its impact on 
domestic political debate? 
Relatedly, at a time when international institutions of all stripes are de-
rided for being elitist entities that are out of touch with the concerns of 
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ordinary people in member states,291 studies are needed to assess whether 
taking a leaf out of the U.S. domestic judicial playbook might help shore up 
international judicial legitimacy. Would it be helpful to humanize the inter-
national judiciary? Should international judges be making more public ap-
pearances and facilitating greater public awareness of their courts’ activities? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Separate judicial speech has a long and controversial history in both do-
mestic and international law, waxing and waning with the function, author-
ity, and composition of courts as well as judges’ role expectations. The dif-
ferent forms of separate judicial speech, the extent to which judges are per-
mitted to and comfortable with exercising them, and the responses that they 
invoke amongst stakeholders reflect the constantly changing legal and polit-
ical environments that both shape and are in turn shaped by domestic and 
international judges.  
This Article has mapped and dissected the regulatory frameworks, prac-
tices, and values underlying separate speech by judges in domestic and in-
ternational courts. It offered five dimensions of variance along which this 
speech might fall, on and off the bench. It argued that these variations in 
form carry a range of connotations and further different forms of separate 
speech convey very different messages for their recipients, with conse-
quences that are both intended and unintended. These differences have real 
world implications for both courts as legal institutions that make and inter-
pret law and for judges as individual legal actors who represent the law and 
shape its legitimacy.   
Scholars have long recognized the unique status that judicial decisions 
and, by extension, judges occupy in domestic and international law due to 
their semantic and normative authority.292 However, international lawyers 
have not been as attentive as their domestic counterparts to the political 
capital demonstrated by and exerted through the judicial office and to the 
myriad ways in which judges might use this capital to bolster both their own 
professional and personal image, as well as that of the institutions they are 
duty bound to serve and uphold. In the current political climate of backlash 
against international courts and tribunals, the very survival of these institu-
tions may depend on judges embracing this role and its potential.  
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